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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the validity and enforceability of
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses combining arbitration
and litigation. Such clauses are currently favored by businesses in
their search for a method of dispute resolution that provides a
more favorable position for one of the parties to an agreement and
ensures better enforcement against the assets of the counterparty.
For mathematicians, a thing is symmetrical "if there is
something that you can do to it so that after you have finished
doing it it looks the same as it did before."1 This article uses the
term "symmetry" in the sense of "bilateral symmetry," that is "the
symmetry of left and right, which is so conspicuous in the
structure of the higher animals, especially the human body."2
Private law has often been said to be characterized by symmetry,
starting with the requirement that both parties must manifest
assent for a contract to be formed. But, on closer examination, the
symmetry of private law is not perfect. For example, for a contract
to be formed, the parties' manifestation of assent need not be
symmetric in time, place, or form. Asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses represent another dent in the symmetry of
private law.
Such clauses provide for one (bilateral) dispute resolution
forum (arbitration or litigation) while also giving a unilateral
right to one party to elect to refer a particular dispute to another
1 Richard P. Feynman, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 84 (MIT Press
Paperback 121' prtg. 1985).
2 Hermann Weyl, SYMMETRY 3-4 (New Princeton Science Library 2016). See also
Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIz L. REV.
861, 865-74 (2000) (discussing symmetry in physics and in law).
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forum. Such clauses are known as "unilateral option clauses" or
"one-sided" dispute resolution clauses, but we prefer to use the
term "asymmetrical" rather than "unilateral," although the latter
is undoubtedly more common, in order to emphasize that the
choices of one contractual party are different from, and usually
broader than, the choices of the contractual counterparty. 3
dispute resolution clauses have been
Asymmetrical
considered by courts in various jurisdictions during the past few
years, with respect to their enforceability and validity. Any
dispute resolution clause aims to achieve two primary objectives:
select a convenient and predictable forum for the resolution of
disputes under a particular contract and, conversely, eliminate
other potentially applicable fora perceived as unfavorable by one
party or both. In selecting the forum (or eliminating, by
implication, other fora) parties take into consideration a variety of
factors, such as enforceability, procedural aspects (impartiality,
efficiency), and other factors (e.g., linguistic barriers). A difficult
choice must sometimes be made, in selecting the forum, between
litigation and arbitration. The factors that inform that choice are
well-known: confidentiality versus publicity, availability of
discovery, joinder, consolidation and summary judgment,
applicability of binding precedent, cost, speed, enforceability, etc.
In particular, ease of enforcement is a classic consideration. Court
judgments are more difficult to enforce than arbitral awards,
especially in an international context, absent a specific reciprocal
enforcement treaty (or, in the European Union, the application of
the Brussels I Recast Regulation 4). Arbitral awards benefit from
the recognition and enforcement process applicable between the

3 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, "Asymmetrical Arbitration Clauses"-The United
States, in JURISDICTIONAL CHOICES IN TIMES OF TROUBLE (Georges Affaki & Horacio
Grigera Na6n eds., 2015); Sherina Petit et al., Asymmetric Arbitration Agreements: A
Global Perspective, 9 INT'L ARB. REP. 25 (2017); see also Simon Nesbitt & Henry
Quinlan, The Status and Operation of Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clauses, 22
ARB. INT'L 133, 134 (2006); Adam M. Nahmias, The Enforceability of Contract Clauses
Giving One Party the UnilateralRight to Choose Between Arbitration and Litigation, 21
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 36, 36 (2001).
4 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters).
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member states to the New York Convention, 5 which has been
widely adopted by over 150 countries.
Asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses seek to preserve the
advantages of both litigation and arbitration.
They enable the party vested with the option [the
unrestricted party, or "UP"] to choose between the differing
advantages of each forum . . . . This election is made after the
dispute has arisen, when both the nature of the dispute and
the identity of the counter-party [the restricted party, or
"RP"] are known. This enables [the unrestricted] party to
choose the dispute resolution forum that will best [suit its
interest,] taking into account both the speed with which [the
dispute needs] to be resolved[, any confidentiality concerns,]
and the likely location of assets against which enforcement
will eventually be required. 6
Asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses are a common
feature in many international transaction documents, particularly
in credit agreements, software solution and licensing agreements,
film licensing agreements, tenancy and construction contracts, 7
employment agreements, and consumer agreements.8 The UP
tends to be the party with the higher bargaining power (such as
the lender, the licensor, the employer, or the professional). It
cannot always be excluded that the UP, as part of strategic
contract negotiations, would bargain for its additional option with
6 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
10 June 1958), N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
Arbitral Awards (New York,
https://www.newyorkconvention.org/english [https://perma.cc/RP6T-XW4A] (last visited
May 1, 2021). See also Lucy Greenwood, A New York Convention Primer, ABA (Sept.
12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute resolution/publications/dispute
_resolutiormagazine/2019/summer-2019-new-york-convention/summer-2019-ny-conve
ntion-primer/ [https://perma.cc/E25Y-HRPZ].
6 See Marie Berard, James Dingley & Melissa Brown, Unilateral Option Clauses
in Arbitration: An International Overview, PRAcTICAL LAW (June 23, 2017),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8abcb55b 1c9a1 le38578f7ecc38dcbee/View/
FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&originationContext=document&transitionTyp
t=DocumentItem&firstPage=true [https://perma.c/7482-H4XA].
7 Nahmias, supra note 3, at 36; Bas van Zelst, Unilateral Option Arbitration
Clauses: An Unequivocal Choice for Arbitration Under the ECHR?, 25 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & CoMP. L. 77, 79 (2018).
8 Duarte Gorjao Henriques, Asymmetrical Arbitration Clauses Under the
Portuguese Law, 3 YOUNG ARB. REV. 44, 53 (2013) (employment agreements and
consumer agreements).
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full awareness of (and maybe even desire for) the risk of
unenforceability of the unilateral option or even of the entire
dispute resolution mechanism.
"[T]he differing attitudes towards [asymmetrical] dispute
resolution clauses in many jurisdictions mean that the benefits
offered by the theoretical flexibility of [such] clauses are often
tempered by . . . uncertainty as to whether they will function as
they are intended to." 9 Case law in a number of countries indicates
that the devil is in the details with respect to the validity of
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses. That is why it is helpful
to attempt to classify them (Part I), before reviewing the legal
issues they raise (Part II) and the legal trends in a number of key
jurisdictions, which we classify in three categories: countries likely
to uphold and enforce such clauses (Part III), countries likely to
invalidate and/or refuse enforcement (Part IV) and countries
where the jury is still deliberating (Part V). We then draw
conclusions from our survey, offer a proposed approach regarding
the appropriate remedy in case of invalidity, and practical advice
for efficiently drafting asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses.
I. AN ATTEMPT AT TAXONOMY OF ASYMMETRICAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CLAUSES
Asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses can be divided into
two major categories: (i) bilateral arbitration clause with a
unilateral option to litigate and (ii) bilateral litigation clause with
a unilateral option to arbitrate. Other, less prevalent, varieties
also exist.
Bilateral arbitration clause with a unilateral option to
litigate. The most commonly encountered asymmetrical dispute
resolution clause is a clause which begins by providing for
arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism, but then also
10
gives to the UP alone the right to commence litigation instead.

9

See B6rard et al., supra note 6.
See, e.g., Law Debenture Trust plc. v. Elektrim Finance BV, [2005] EWHC 1412,
[3] (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[A]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with these
presents . . . may be submitted by any party to arbitration for final settlement," and
"neither [ESA] nor [EFBV] shall be permitted to bring proceedings in any other court
or tribunal," but "[n]otwithstanding" this, "the Trustee and each of the Bondholders
shall have the exclusive right, at their option, to apply to the courts of England who
10
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In other words, both parties agree to arbitrate any disputes
between them, but the UP is also expressly given the option to
initiate litigation, with respect to (i) any claim that the UP
chooses to bring or (ii) certain categories of claims that are
expressly "carved-out" from the overall arbitration clause. 1' This
type of clause is commonly referred to as a "unilateral litigation
clause" (or "unilateral jurisdiction clause") and is typically drafted
as follows:
Any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with the
Agreement may be submitted by any party to arbitration
before X for final settlement and neither RP nor UP shall be
permitted to bring proceedings in any other court or tribunal.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, any dispute arising
out of or in connection with this Agreement, UP shall have
the exclusive right, at its option, to apply to the courts of Y
who shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle any
disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this
Agreement.
Bilateral litigation clause with a unilateral option to
arbitrate. Here, the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause
begins by choosing an exclusive judicial forum for any claims
brought by either party but goes on expressly to grant to the UP
alone the option of bringing any dispute to arbitration.1 2 This type

shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in
connection with these presents .... ") (citation omitted).
1 The most prevalent contractual "carve-outs" grant to the UP, despite the
agreement to arbitrate, the right to seek in court: (i) "injunctive and/or other equitable
relief," (ii) protection of IP rights and/or goodwill, (iii) "foreclosure of a security
interest," (iv) "recovery of possession or eviction," and (v) "collection of a debt." Rau,
supra note 3 at 28. See also Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 762-64 (2001) (list of "carve-outs" in franchise contracts, the
most common being trademark disputes and equitable relief sought by a franchisor).
12 See, e.g., NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2001,
[7] (appeal taken from Eng.) ("The courts of England shall have jurisdiction to settle
any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Charterparty but the
Owner shall have the option of bringing any dispute hereunder to arbitration.");
Deutsche Bank AG v. Tongkah Harbour Public Co. Ltd., [2011] EWHC 2251, [9]
(appeal taken from Eng.) ("Courts of England shall have jurisdiction to settle any
disputes . . . which may arise in connection with any Finance Document," but
"[n]otwithstanding" this, "any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Finance
Documents . . . may at the option of the relevant Finance Party . . . be referred to and
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of clause is commonly referred to as a "unilateral arbitration
clause" and is typically drafted as follows:
Courts of X shall have jurisdiction to settle any disputes
which may arise out of or in connection with this Agreement.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, any dispute arising
out of or in connection with this Agreement may, at the option
of UP, be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration before
Y.
There is also sub-distinction that carries legal relevance. It is
in the manner of defining the UP, the party that has the option.
The UP can be defined either (i) nominally (Company X) or by its
title in the transaction (Buyer, Lender, etc.) or (ii) can be defined
by its procedural quality (Claimant). As we will see, the first
drafting method results in increased risk of invalidity, whereas
the second drafting method serves to reduce such risk.
Other garden variety. In addition to the two most common
forms discussed above, the sky is the limit in terms of the
creativity of contract drafters.
For example, a dispute resolution clause sometimes provides
just that: "RP hereby agrees that any and all disputes with UP
shall be resolved by binding arbitration." 13 The clause is drafted to
impose an obligation on one party alone to submit any claims to
arbitration (as opposed to giving a unilateral right to one of the
parties to submit disputes to arbitration). The effects of a clause
drafted in this manner are unclear. The likely meaning is that the
UP has no obligation to trigger arbitration in order to resolve the
UP's own claims (the UP can resort to the competent courts or
choose arbitration), but the RP may only bring its disputes to
arbitration (and, in such a case, the UP is bound to arbitrate).
Another example is where the contract grants the UP the
"sole option" to require the RP to submit any dispute between the
parties to arbitration, by providing that "any dispute between RP
finally resolved by arbitration."). See also Nesbitt & Quinlan, supra note 3, at 134;
Nahmias, supra note 3, at 36.
13 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Long Island Carpet Cleaning, 5 Misc. 2d 684, 684 (N.Y. App.
Term 1956) ("While the customer's claims are required to be arbitrated, the company's
claim for money due is at its sole option litigable in the courts."); Noohi v. Toll Bros.,
hereby agree[s] that any and all
Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 609-10 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Buyer ...
disputes with Seller .. . shall be resolved by binding arbitration.").
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and UP, shall, at UP's sole option/election, be decided by
arbitration."1 4 The intended effect is that the UP is able to initiate
arbitration with respect to its own claims, and can invoke the
arbitral process both as respondent and as claimant, while the RP
cannot initiate arbitration with respect to the RP's claims. These
clauses are typically reviewed as unilateral arbitration clauses,
with an additional negative factor that adds to their likely
invalidity (the possibility of the UP to remove a claim commenced
by the RP in courts by invoking its unilateral arbitration option).
Finally, there are clauses that appear to impose a mutual
obligation to arbitrate, but one party (the UP) retains the right to
change any terms of the agreement, including the arbitration
clause itself, in its own discretion. Unsurprisingly, such clauses
are typically found to be void because the promise to arbitrate is
illusory,1 5 except when the right to modify (including to terminate)
the agreement only applies prospectively, and not retroactively. 16

.

14 See, e.g., Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Constr.Co. & Assoc., 656 P.2d
1184, 1184 (Alaska 1983) ("Contractor, at its sole option, shall have the right to require
Subcontractor to arbitrate any and all claims, disputes, and other matters in question
between the Contractor and the Subcontractor arising out of or related to the
Subcontract or the breach thereof."); Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y.
1989) ("any dispute ... shall at the Company's election, which election may be made at
any time prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding by the Company, or in the
event instituted by the Employee at any time prior to the last day to answer and/or
respond to a summons and/or complaint made by the Employee, be submitted to
arbitration"); Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Ltd. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d
575, 577 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("any dispute between San Jose and Subcontractor, shall, at
San Jose's sole option, be decided by arbitration"); United States v. Consigli Constr.
Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 409, 411 (D. Me. 2012) ("[a]ny and all claims or disputes arising
out of or relating to this Agreement . . . shall be decided, at the sole discretion of [UP],
either by submission to (1) arbitration ... or (2) judicial decision by the Superior Court
in the State of Maine"); Boatright v. Aegis Defense Servs., LLC, 938 F. Supp. 2d 602,
605 (E.D. Va. 2013) ("If [RP] seeks relief from [UP] in court relating to a Dispute, [UP]
.. may at its option within sixty (60) days of service of [RP's] complaint, require all or
part of the dispute to be arbitrated.").
16 See Caire v. Conifer Value Based Care, LLC, 982 F. Supp. 2d 582, 594 (D. Md.
2013) (arbitration agreement void because the UP "made no promise to arbitrate at
all"); Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
(same holding); Stanich v. Hissong Grp., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-0143, 2010 WL 3732129, at
*7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (same holding); Phox v. Atriums Mgmt. Co., 230 F. Supp.
2d 1279, 1283 (D. Kan. 2002) ("arbitration clause does not constitute a separate
binding agreement because defendant's promise to arbitrate is illusory").
16 Lizalde v. Vista Quality Mkts., 746 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2014) (the fact that
"termination of the Arbitration Agreement is restricted to prospective claims" means
that the agreement was not rendered "illusory"); Williams v. TCF Nat'l Bank, No. 12 C
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II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY ASYMMETRICAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES
Within each category, quirks of drafting may present
particular interpretive problems, but in all cases, whatever the
structure of the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause, the
bottom line is that one party (the RP) has narrower rights than its
counterparty (the UP) or, flipping the perspective, one party (the
UP) has broader options than its counterparty (the RP).
As such, from the perspective of the RP, asymmetrical
dispute resolution clauses raise issues of equality of the parties,
both at the stage of the negotiations (or lack thereof) that led to
the adoption of the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause, and at
the stage of the proceedings once a dispute has arisen and one of
the parties has taken legal action under the asymmetrical dispute
resolution clause. With respect to international disputes, Article
18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration provides: "The parties shall be treated with equality
and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his
case." 17 One of the debates is whether Article 18 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
as reflected in the national arbitration laws governing
international commercial arbitrations, applies to both stages, i.e.
before and after the commencement of legal proceedings.
Asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses also raise issues of
potestativeness. The term "potestative" refers to the fact that the
fulfillment of the agreement is dependent upon an event which
one of the parties has the power to make happen or prevent from
happening, or, in other words, the event is entirely within the
power of only one party to the contract. The doctrine of
potestativity is part of general contract law in several civil law
countries. 18 In these countries, obligations contracted subject to a
05115, 2013 WL 708123, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013) ("contract did not purport to
render modifications retroactively applicable to already-pending disputes," as it
provided that "no change" to the arbitration clause would apply "after [UP] received
[RP's] notice" of a claim).
1

U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAw, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL

COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION art. 18 at 14 (2006).
18 See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1170 (Fr.) ("Toute clause qui
prive de sa substance l'obligation essentielle du d6biteur est r6put6e non ecrite.") ("A
clause that deprives the essential obligation of the debtor if its substance is void"
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potestative condition to the benefit of the party binding itself are
void. A similar concept, used in other jurisdictions, is that of a
"contingent contract," which can be defined as a contract to enter
into a contract.
Other legal concepts that are sometimes invoked by the RP
(and courts) are the common law concept of unconscionability and
the doctrine of "gross disparity," which typically provide that a
clause may be avoided if it "unjustifiably gave the other party an
excessive advantage."1 9
Finally, a related question sometimes discussed in case law is
the doctrine of separability of the arbitration agreement from the
container contract. The original purpose of the doctrine is to
preserve the validity of the arbitration agreement in situations
where the existence or validity of the container contract is at
issue. The principle of separability is well-established and
recognized by most arbitration laws and rules, as well as by
courts, arbitral tribunals, and legal scholars. For example, Article
16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration provides that an "arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement." 20 It is unanimously
agreed that this provision embodies the cornerstone principle of
kompetenz-kompetenz (also known as the principle of compitencecompitence in its French translation). Article 16 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
goes on to explain that, for the purpose of ruling on the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement, "an arbitration clause

(author's translation)); Art. 1355 C.c. (It.).(conditions precedent to a contract cannot
depend exclusively on one party's will and must be objective).
19 See, e.g., INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 3.2.7 at 411 (2010), which
provides:
(1) A party may avoid the contract or an individual term of it if, at the time of
the conclusion of the contract, the contract or term unjustifiably gave the
other party an excessive advantage. Regard is to be had, among other factors,
to (a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the first
party's dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence,
ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining skill; and (b) the nature and
purpose of the contract.
20 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, supra note 17, at 30.
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which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract" and that "[a]
decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void
2
shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause." 1
This principle was sometimes, in our view, misapplied in cases
involving asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses.
From the perspective of the UP, the arguments are
typically based on freedom of contract (and, in jurisdictions that
require it as a condition for valid contract formation, exchange of
consideration) and, as specifically applied to arbitration, the
principle of party autonomy, a cornerstone principle of arbitration,
which is unanimously recognized. 22 For example, Article 19 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
provides: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are
free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral
23
tribunal in conducting the proceedings."
The agreement to arbitrate is a mutually binding promise to
refer disputes to arbitration. Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration defines the
arbitration agreement as "an agreement by the parties to submit
to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not." 24 In cases where, under the
asymmetrical dispute resolution clause, only one party has the
right to refer a dispute to arbitration, the legal issue is whether or
not the parties manifested a clear intent to arbitrate, required for
the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Within. these parameters, several laws are relevant to the
question of validity and enforcement of a particular asymmetrical

21 Id.
22 See,

e.g., FOUCHARD,

GAILLARD,

GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION, 31 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); Nigel Blackaby,
Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, & Martin Hunter, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1.108 (Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 2015); GARY
B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 31 (Kluwer Law International, 3d
ed. 2020); MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND
PRACTICE, 56 (2d ed. 2001); MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2d ed. 2012).

23 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAw, supra note 17, at art. 19.
24 Id. at art. 7.
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dispute resolution clause, in particular the law which governs the
container contract of the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause,
the law of the chosen seat, and the law(s) of any jurisdictions
relevant at the enforcement stage of the arbitral award 25
Consequently, drafters (and interpreters) of asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses must often review not just the domestic law, but
a multitude of foreign laws. Several surveys have been published,
most of which focus on unilateral litigation clauses 26 . The present
study 27 reviews and refines the findings reported by other authors
in key jurisdictions, adds additional jurisdictions and recent case
law, includes both unilateral litigation clauses and unilateral
arbitration clauses, as well as other varieties of asymmetrical
dispute resolution clauses, and draws comprehensive conclusions
based on which drafting tips are suggested.
III. JURISDICTIONS COMFORTABLE WITH ASYMMETRY

A. Australia
Australian courts have "generally upheld the validity of
asymmetrical arbitration agreements." 28 The Australian High
Court has reasoned, for example, that the definition of an
arbitration agreement is "wide enough to encompass agreements
by which the parties are bound to have their dispute[s] arbitrated
if an election is made or some event occurs, or some condition is
satisfied" and further held that the arbitration agreement is valid

26 See, Berard et al., supra note 6.
26 See, e.g., id. This survey of the effectiveness of unilateral litigation clauses in 60

jurisdictions, classified those jurisdictions in several categories. The first category
encompassed countries where such clauses have been confirmed as effective or are
likely to be effective: Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Singapore, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, among others. The second category
encompassed countries where such clauses have been confirmed as ineffective or are
likely to be ineffective: China, France, India, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Turkey,
among others. The third category listed countries that have an uncertain position, such
as, for example, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Philippines,
and Vietnam.
27 Review of case law in the present study is as of December 31, 2018 (except where
otherwise indicated).
28 See BORN, supra note 22, at 86.
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"even if only one party has the right to elect or is in a position to
control the event or satisfy the condition[s]."29
In another case, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that
the uncertainty regarding whether "those conditions are in fact
fulfilled . . . does not deprive [the agreement] of the status of a
binding, if executory, agreement to refer disputes to arbitration."30
In other words, the court found that it is enough that the parties
have agreed that, if certain events happen, their disputes will be
referred to arbitration, even if only at the option of one of the
parties. 31

B. Hong Kong
In China Merchants v. JGC, the dispute resolution clause
provided that "if a dispute could not be settled by mutual
agreement, JGC was required to state its decision, which was
binding until completion of the works." 32 "Once the decision had
been notified to the contractor, the contractor was required to
continue [performing the works and,] if [it] did not agree with
JGC's decision, it had to notify JGC (within fifteen days of
receiving notice of JGC's decision) that it wished to refer the
dispute to arbitration."3 3 All steps were followed, except that the
contractor never notified JGC of its intention to refer the dispute
to arbitration. 34 "The contractor commenced court proceedings and
JGC requested the court to stay the proceedings," 35 based on the
arbitration provisions of the dispute resolution clause.
The court concluded that a clause which gave "only one of the
parties the right to refer any dispute" to arbitration was "an
arbitration agreement within the meaning of [Article 7 of the]

29 PMT Partners Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Austral Nati'l Parks & Wildlife Servs [1995]
HCA 36 (Austl.). See also Nesbitt & Quinlan, supra note 3, at 147-48.
30 See Mulgrave Central Mill Co v Hagglunds Drives Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 471, 5
(Austl.); See also Nesbitt & Quinlan, supra note 3, at 147-48.
31 Nesbitt & Quinlan, supranote 3, at 147-48.
32 JUDITA
PEREtNYIOVA,
UNILATERAL
OPTION
CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 28-29 (2014) (LL.M. Short Thesis, Central European University) (citing
China Merch. Heavy Indus. Co. v. JGC Corp., [2001] 3 HKC 580 (High Ct. of the Hong
Kong Spec. Admin. Region, C.A. July 4, 2001) (China)).
33 PERtNYIOVA, supra note 32, at 28.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
which applies in Hong Kong." 36 "The court held that the fact that
the party failed to exercise its right to refer a dispute to
arbitration did not render the arbitration clause inoperative" and
consequently ordered the stay of the court proceedings. 37 Stated
differently, the court interpreted the contractor's unilateral right
to refer disputes to arbitration as an obligation to refer disputes to
arbitration, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts. The
contractor did not have the right to choose between arbitration
and court litigation.

C. Italy
Unilateral arbitration clauses "have consistently been upheld
by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, broadly on the basis that the
parties should, in principle, be free to agree how to determine
their disputes, including granting one party only the option to
refer a dispute to arbitration." 38 In validating such clauses, Italian
courts also relied on Article 1331 of the Italian Civil Code, which
deals with the effects of unilateral declarations and provides:
"When the parties agree that one of them should be bound by its
own declaration and the other has the choice to accept it or not,
the declaration of the former is considered as an irrevocable
proposal . . . ." 39 There is also broad consensus among Italian
scholars that the validity approach is correct. 40
That view is reinforced by the fact that Italian courts also
upheld unilateral forum selection clauses (with no arbitration
component) in two recent cases. 41
36 Id.

37 Id.
38 Nesbitt & Quinlan, supra note 3, at 144 & n.29 (citing Italian Supreme Court,
judgment no. 2096 of Oct. 22, 1970, published in Guistizia Civile Mass., 1970, p. 1103
and stating in footnote that "[t]he Milan Court of Appeal has also considered, and
upheld, the validity of unilateral clauses").
39 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Arbitrato Unilateralmente Facoltatiuo [Unilateral
Arbitration Clauses], in IL DIRITTO DELL'ARBITRATO 16-19 (CEDAM Ed., 2000).
40 Nesbitt & Quinlan, supra note 3, at 144. But see, e.g., Renato Vecchione, Sulla
Validit& Della Clausola Compromissoria Unilaterale [On the Validity of Unilateral
Arbitration Clauses], IV Giurisprudenza Italiana 65 (1963) (arguing for invalidity of
arbitration clauses).
41 See Claudio Perrella, Italy: Italian Supreme Court Considers Unilateral
Jurisdiction
Clauses,
MONDAQ
(Apr.
8,
2013),
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In the Sportal Italia v Microsoft case from 2011, the contract
was subject "to the laws of the state of Washington and specif[ied]
that . . . the Italian company [Sportal Italia] consented to the
exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the courts in Washington (with
an additional provision that the 'company waive[d] all defenses of
lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens'), [while]
the other party-(Microsoft)-was free to [start litigation before]
Italian courts." 42 Microsoft started litigation against Sportal Italia
before Italian courts. 43
The Milan Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the clause,
noting "that such clauses have long existed and been permitted in
the Italian legal system." 44 "[T]he court found an example of an
asymmetrical clause in the [1930] bilateral convention . .
between Italy and France," 46 and noted that Article 17 of the 1968
Brussels Convention (which was later replaced by the Brussels I
Regulation) gave the parties the possibility to agree on such a
hybrid clause. 46 That provision states: "if an agreement conferring
jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the
parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings in
any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this
Convention." 47 The "court added that the Italian defendant could
not object to the jurisdiction of its 'natural' judge, and that the
alleged imbalance existing between the parties had not taken
place in the case at hand [because] Microsoft had preferred to
make use of Italian courts instead of filing the lawsuit in
Washington." 48
In the Grinka v Intesa San Paolo case from 2012,49 the
Italian Supreme Court considered the validity of a clause that

https://www.mondaq.com/italy/arbitration-dispute-resolution/231358/italian-supremecourt-considers-unilateral-jurisdiction-clauses [https://perma.cc/3Z94-SKLJ].
42 Id. (citing Sportal Italia v. Microsoft Corp., Corte D'Appello di Milano, 22 Sep.

2011(It.)).
4 Id.
4

Id.

4 Id.
4s Id.
47 Id. (citing Brussels

Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 35, art. 17).
4 Id.
4 Grinka in liquidazione v. Intesa San Paolo, Simest, HSBC, Cass., 11 Apr. 2012
(It.).
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"provided that one party was bound to refer contractual disputes
to the English courts while the other had the liberty to bring an
action 'before Italian courts or any other judge having jurisdiction
pursuant to the international conventions."' 50 The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the clause.5 1 Italian contract law generally
prohibits potestative conditions. 2 Nevertheless, "the Supreme
Court found nothing wrong with the possibility [of one party] to
choose among various jurisdictions, despite the fact that such a
choice depends on the mere will of that party."5 3 We will see that,
when confronted with an arguably similar clause, the French
Supreme Court took a radically different position, both with
respect to the interpretation of the relevant EU provisions and
with respect to the application of the doctrine of potestativity, and
invalidated the clause (see infra Part V.1).

D. Portugal
In the Xilam Animation v. Lnk Videos case from 2012, the
Oeiras First Instance Tribunal, and afterwards the Lisbon Court
of Appeal, excluded any presumption of invalidity of a unilateral
arbitration clause due to its inclusion in a standard contract.5 4
The courts reasoned that "'inconvenient' arbitration clauses would
be [deemed null and] void only when the respective provisions
would cause gross inconvenience to one of the parties" and not
provide any particular benefits to its counterparty. 5 Moreover,
legal scholars agree that there is no requirement of mutuality
under Portuguese general contract law and, although clearly
imbalanced, there is little evidence to support the idea that
unilateral arbitration clauses violate Portuguese public policy.66

50 Perrella, supra note 41.

Id.
52 Art. 1355 C.c. (It.) (conditions precedent to a contract cannot depend exclusively
51

on one party's will and must be objective).
63 Perrella, supra note 41.
64 See Xilam Animation v. Lnk Videos, Tribunal da Relagao de Lisboa [Lisbon
Court of Appeal] of 07-12-2012 (Port.).
66 See IURII USTINOV, UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES: LEGAL VALIDITY 26
(2016) (Master's Thesis, Tilburg University).
56 See Henriques, supra note 8, at 52-54.
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In 2017, the Singapore
confirmed the validity of an
clause, in Wilson Taylor Asia
Ltd.67 In that case, the relevant
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Court of Appeal unequivocally
asymmetrical dispute resolution
Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. Dyna-Jet Pte
contract provided that:

Any claim or dispute . . . shall be settled amicably between
the parties by mutual consultation. If no amicable settlement
is reached through discussions, at the election of Dyna-Jet,
the dispute may be referred to and personally settled by
means of arbitration proceedings, which will be conducted
under English Law; and held in Singapore. 58
Therefore, the clause was not only asymmetrical but it was
also optional. If no amicable settlement were possible, Dyna-Jet
could elect to submit the dispute to arbitration or to start
litigation.5 9 Following a dispute between the parties, Dyna-Jet
suspended the works under the contract and commenced litigation
proceedings against the defendant, before the Singapore High
Court. 60 The defendant sought a stay in favor of the arbitration
agreement between the parties, which was denied. 6 1
The Singapore High Court concluded that there was nothing
objectionable in the fact that the agreement was one-sided or that
it lacked mutuality:
The Judge held that the Clause constituted an arbitration
agreement despite its asymmetrical nature. After an
extensive survey of modern Commonwealth authority, the
Judge decided that a contractual dispute resolution
agreement conferring an asymmetric right (in other words, a
right enjoyed by only one party to the agreement but not by

the other) to elect whether to arbitrate a future dispute was
nevertheless an arbitration agreement. Thus he dismissed the
Respondent's argument that the Clause was not an
arbitration agreement because of its "lack of mutuality". The

67 Wilson Taylor Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. Dyna-Jet Pte. Ltd., [2017] SGCA 32
(Sing.).
58 Id. at $4.
69 Petit et al., supranote 3, at 25.
60 Dyna-Jet, at ¶ 5.
61 Id. at $6.
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Judge also held that the fact that a contractual disputeresolution agreement granted a right to elect whether to
arbitrate a future dispute was nevertheless an arbitration
agreement. Therefore the characteristic of "optionality" in a
dispute-resolution agreement was not inconsistent with the
meaning or nature of an arbitration agreement. Summing up

these principles, he concluded that a contractual disputeresolution agreement which confers an asymmetric right to
elect whether to arbitrate a future dispute is properly
regarded as an arbitration agreement.6 2
The Court of Appeal concurred, confirming the finding of the
Singapore High Court that the unilateral option clause was valid
and binding.63 The Court of Appeal held that the dispute
resolution clause was a valid arbitration agreement and that it
was "immaterial" that the clause was asymmetrical, or that
arbitration was optional (instead of imposing on the parties an
immediate obligation to arbitrate their disputes). 64 However,
because Dyna-Jet had elected to refer the dispute to the courts
(and had not elected to resolve the dispute to arbitration in
accordance with its right to do so), the dispute could no longer be
referred to arbitration and was destined to be pursued in the
Singapore courts. 65 As such, the defendant's application for a stay
of the court litigation in favor of arbitration was dismissed. 66 This
is the first case where the Singapore Court of Appeal ruled on the
validity of an asymmetrical dispute resolution clause with a
unilateral option to arbitrate under Singapore law.

F. Spain
A 2013 decision of the Madrid Court of Appeal in the
Camimalaga SAU v. DAF Vehiculos Industriales SA and DAF
Truck NVcase 6 7 upheld an asymmetrical dispute resolution clause
Id. at 1 8 (citations omitted).
63 Id. at ¶ 13.
62

64 Id.

66 Id. at ¶ 24.
66 Id. at ¶ 26.
67

Camimalaga SAU v. DAF Vehiculos Industriales SA and DAF Truck NV, Oct.

18, 2013 (Sp.) See also Deyan Draguiev, UnilateralJurisdictionClauses: The Case for
Invalidity, Severability or Enforceability, 31 J. INT.'L ARB. 19, 28 (2014); Ustinov, supra
note 55, at 26.; Per6nyiovi, supra note 32, at 30.
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included in an agreement between a Spanish company and a
Dutch company, and the Dutch company's Spanish subsidiary.
The "dispute in question (which related to anti-trust and
unfair competition issues) arose out of a series of agreements that
had been entered into by a Spanish truck dealership and the
Spanish subsidiary of the well-known Dutch truck manufacturer,
DAF."68 "Each agreement contained a [unilateral option] clause
allowing the claimant to elect to refer disputes either to
arbitration under the arbitration rules of the Netherlands
Arbitration Institute or to specified Dutch courts." 69
"The Spanish truck dealership commenced proceedings before
the Spanish courts on the basis that . . . [t]he [asymmetrical
dispute resolution] clause was invalid, both as an agreement to
arbitrate and as a [jurisdiction] clause." 70 The Spanish truck
dealership also argued that "[u]nfair competition and anti-trust
issues were not arbitrable as a matter of Spanish law (such that
the arbitration option was of no application)" 7 1 and that "the
contractually agreed dispute resolution mechanism was of no
application in any event" because "the dispute was not a
contractual one." 72 "DAF raised an objection to the Spanish court's
jurisdiction on the basis that all disputes should either be referred
to arbitration under the arbitration rules of the Netherlands
Arbitration Institute or to the specified Dutch courts [pursuant to]
the parties' agreement." 73
"The Spanish court of first instance upheld DAF's objection
on the basis that the Spanish courts were not one of the dispute
resolution fora selected by the parties (impliedly holding that the
unilateral option clause was valid)."74 "The Spanish truck
dealership appealed this decision to the Madrid Court of
Appeal." 75 The Madrid Court of Appeal held that "unfair
competition and anti-trust issues" are arbitrable and "that the

68 See Berard et al., supra note 6.
69 Id.
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73 Id.
74
76

Id.
Id.
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parties' agreement to submit disputes to the Dutch courts was ...
valid" under the Brussels I Regulation. 76
The Madrid Court of Appeal also held that "there is nothing
in Spanish law undermining the effect of unilateral clauses" and
that "the combination of arbitration and court litigation options
can be justified on grounds of party autonomy." 77 As such, relying
on the principle of party autonomy, the Madrid Court of Appeal
concluded that the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause was
valid and binding. 78
"This represented a significant departure from the previous
Spanish law position," 79 which had focused on the requirement for
unequivocal consent to arbitration. The Camimalaga decision was
"the first time [when] a unilateral option clause [was] expressly
upheld by the Spanish courts."80

G. United Kingdom
Some early national court decisions concluded that an
arbitration agreement would only be valid if both parties were
granted mutual rights to refer disputes to arbitration. In 1966,
confronted with a clause granting one party, but not the other, a
unilateral right to commence arbitration, an English court in
Baron v. Sunderland voided the clause, reasoning:
It seems to me that this is about as unlike an arbitration
clause as anything that one could imagine. It is necessary in
an arbitration clause that either party shall agree to refer
disputes to arbitration, and it is an essential ingredient in
that either party may in the event of a dispute arising refer it
in the provided manner to arbitration. In other words, the
clause must give bilateral rights of reference. 81

,8 Id.
77 See Draguiev, supra note 67, at 28.
78

B6rard et al., supra note 6.

79 Id.
80 Id.

81 Baron v. Sunderland Corp., [1966] 1 All ER 349, 351 (Eng.) (holding that
"mutuality" was necessary for a valid arbitration agreement and defining it to mean
that all parties to an agreement should have "equal procedural rights"). See also Tote
Bookmakers Ltd. v. Dev. & Prop. Holding Co., [1985] 2 All ER 555 (Eng.).
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Starting in 1986, English decisions expressly overruled that
approach and refused to require that arbitration agreements be
mutual or symmetrical. In Pittalisv. Sherefettin, the court held:
I can see no reason why, if an agreement between two persons
confers on one of them alone the right to refer the matter to
arbitration, the reference should not constitute an arbitration.
There is a fully bilateral agreement which constitutes a
contract to refer. The fact that the option is exercisable by
only one of the parties seems to me to be irrelevant. The
arrangement suits both parties. 82
The NB Three Shipping v. Harebell Shipping case from 2004
is a leading authority on asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses
with a unilateral option to arbitrate (unilateral arbitration
clause). 83 In that case, the dispute resolution clause provided: "the
courts of England shall have jurisdiction to settle any disputes
which may arise out of or in connection with this Charterparty but
the Owner shall have the option of bringing any dispute
hereunder to arbitration." 84 As such, both of the parties (the
charterer and the shipowner) could bring litigation proceedings,
while only one party (the shipowner) had the right to arbitration. 85
The charterer started litigation before the High Court.86 Shortly
thereafter, the shipowner's solicitors wrote: "[g]iven our client's
option we are surprised that you did not consult with our client
before you commenced court proceedings." 87 The shipowner then
"sought to stay the court proceedings under [S]ection 9 of the
[English] Arbitration Act 1996 . . . and refer the dispute to
arbitration." 88
The court held that the asymmetrical clause was designed to
give "better rights" to the shipowner than to the charterer, and
gave the shipowner "a right to stop or stay a court action brought

82 Pittalis v. Sherefettin, [1986] 2 All ER 227, 231 (Eng.) (overruling Baron, which
had relied on the mutuality doctrine). See also BORN, supra note 22, at 85.
83 NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2001 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
84 Id. at 7- 8.
88

Id.

88 Id.
87 Id. at 5.
88 Berard et al., supra note 6.
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against them, at their option."89 Consequently, the court found
that the shipowner's:
[A]pplication to stay court proceedings under Section 9 of the
[English Arbitration Act] 1996 was consistent with the
commercial sense of the clause. In other words, the
[ship]owner's right to refer any dispute[s] to arbitration
remained even if the charterer[] tried to bypass this right by
initiating proceedings without first consulting the [ship] owner
on the desired forum. 90
While [the court] noted that it would have been preferable for
the clause to provide more detail as to the circumstances in
which the option to arbitrate could be exercised or would be
lost, and [to provide that] the [ship]owner's option 'would
cease to be available if owners took a step in the action or
they otherwise led charterers to believe on reasonable
grounds that the option to stay would not be exercised,' the
absence of such wording did not render the clause
unenforceable. 91
In ruling that the application to stay the litigation satisfied
the requirements of Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act 1996,
the court applied that provision somewhat generously. Section 9
provides:
A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal
proceedings are brought (whether by way of claim or
counterclaim) in respect of a matter which under the
agreement is to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to
the other parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in
which the proceedings have been brought to stay the
proceedings so far as they concern that matter. 92
That provision is intended to apply where a party commences
litigation despite being bound by an arbitration clause and
entitles the other party to have the matter transferred to an
arbitral tribunal, thereby blocking the litigation. "[T]here is a thin

89 NB Three Shipping Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2001 at 11.
90 See B6rard et al., supra note 6.
91 Id.
92 NB Three Shipping Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2001 at 7.
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line between having" a general advantage (the right to choose the
dispute resolution forum, prior to commencement of action) "and
having an advantage after an action is brought" (the right to
remove a dispute brought by the restricted party in a forum
considered inconvenient by the unrestricted party). 93 There is no
subsequent reported authority in the United Kingdom dealing
with the same type of clause. 94
The Law Debenture Trust v. Elektrim Finance case, from
2005, dealt with a clause which provided for arbitration, but
granted an option to one of the parties to litigate (unilateral
jurisdiction clause).95 "The claimant was seeking to enforce the
payment of monies due under bonds issued by [the] first defendant
and guaranteed by the second defendant." 96 "The claimant was the
trustee for various bondholders." 97 The Trust Deed "entitled each
party to enforce the arbitration provision against the other, but
only gave the [trustee] and the bondholders the right to refer
disputes to the English courts." 98 The relevant provisions were:
"Any dispute arising out of or in connection with these presents
may be submitted by any party to arbitration for final settlement
. [,]" and "neither [ESA] nor [EFBV] shall be permitted to bring
proceedings in any other court or tribunal . . . [,]" but
"notwithstanding" this, "the Trustee and each of the Bondholders
shall have the exclusive right, at their option, to apply to the
courts of England who shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to
settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with
these presents." 99
The trustee "commenced court proceedings under Section 72
the
[English Arbitration Act] 1996, seeking a declaration that
of
there was no valid arbitration agreement, and that the English
courts had jurisdiction to decide the matter."1 00 Therefore, "the
court . . . had to decide whether the jurisdiction question itself
93

Draguiev, supra note 67, at 24 n.12.

94 See id. at 36-37.
95 Law Debenture Trust Corp. plc v. Elektrim Finance Fin. B.V., [2005] EWHC
1412 (appeal taken from Eng.).
96 Berard et al., supra note 6.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Law Debenture Trust Corp. PLC, [2005] EWHC 1412, at [3].
100 Berard et al., supra note 6.
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should be decided by the courts or the arbitral tribunal[,] and
whether the dispute should be referred to courts or to
arbitration." 101 The court held that the clause was valid and,
consequently, the trustee's "application to stay arbitration
proceedings was granted[,] as the right to seek arbitration was
subject to the agreed option to litigate" granted to the trustee. 102
The court held that the trustee "had not yet participated in
any arbitration proceedings and was therefore entitled to rely on
Section 72 of the [English Arbitration Act] 1996."103 "Referring to
[the NB Three Shipping v. Harebell Shipping case] as authority
for the 'converse case[,]' concerning an option to arbitrate, [the
court] held that . . . one party [being] granted an 'additional
advantage' did not mean that the clause was invalid."104 The court
reasoned that "many contractual provisions confer advantages to
only one of the parties."1 05 The court also noted that the wording
of the clause was "clear and unequivocal." 106 Consequently, the
court held that the trustee could not be forced to arbitrate if it
wished to commence its own proceedings covering the same
subject matter, but imposed a limitation to the right of the
trustee. Specifically, the court observed: "If [the trustee] starts an
arbitration it would have waived its right (or option) to go by way
of litigation. By the same token, if it participates sufficiently in an
arbitration, it may well be held to have waived its rights to
exercise its option. Subject to that, it has its clear rights." 107
The general approach of the English courts, of giving effect to
the parties' chosen dispute resolution method, even if
asymmetrical, was confirmed in Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd.
v. Hestia Holdings Ltd., decided in 2013.108 In that case, an
asymmetrical forum selection clause in a loan agreement provided
that the "courts of England have exclusive jurisdiction .. ." except

101 Id.
102
105

Petit et al., supra note 3, at 35.
B6rard et al., supra note 6.

104

Id.

105

Id.

100 Law Debenture Trust Corp. plc v. Elektrim Finance Fin. B.V., [2005] EWHC
1412 [40] (appeal taken from Eng.).
107 Id. at 42.
108 Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hestia Holdings Ltd., [2013] EWHC 1328
(appeal taken from Eng.).
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that "the Lender shall not be prevented from taking proceedings
related to a Dispute in any other courts in any jurisdiction."1 0 9 The
borrower defaulted, and the lender brought suit in England. The
court applied English law to the interpretation of the clause (not
Mauritian law, which is based on French law and the application
of the Rothchild decision, discussed in Part V.1 below). 10 Under
English law, the court validated the clause, noting that a textual
interpretation suggested that at the very least the lender "ha[d]
agreed to be subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English
courts, subject to its right to bring claims (which may overlap)
abroad,""' and emphasizing that the clause represented the
parties' contractual bargain.
Similarly, in Barclays v. Ente Nazionale di Previdenza Ed
Assistenza dei Medici e Degli Odontoiatri, decided in 2015, "the
High Court upheld a clause allowing one party to sue only in
English courts but giving the other party a choice."" 2 The' court
noted that there were "good practical reasons" for this
asymmetrical clause." 3 Moreover, in Commerzbank AG v. Pauline
Shipping, the High Court "held that asymmetrical jurisdiction
clauses are exclusive jurisdiction clauses for . . . purpose[s] of
Article 31(2) [of] the Brussels I Recast Regulations."14 This
provision states:
[W]here a court of a Member State on which an agreement as
referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is
seised, any court of another Member State shall stay the
proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of
the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the
agreement.)

15

The court concluded that "with the asymmetric jurisdiction
clauses in the present case, the defendants agreed to sue only in

Id. at 10.
See id. at 32.
111 Id. at 40.
112 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 26.
113 Barclays Bank plc v. Ente Nazionale di Previdenza Ed Assistenza dei Medici e
Degli Odontoiatri, [2015] EWHC 2857 [124] (appeal taken from Eng.).
114 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 26.
116 See European Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351)
1, Art. 31(2).
109

110
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the courts of one EU Member State, England. Instead, they have
enabled another court, the Greek court, to be seized of the matter.
It would undermine the agreements of the parties, and foster
abusive tactics, if the jurisdiction clauses in these agreements
were to be treated not as exclusive, but as non-exclusive." 116
To summarize, "English courts . . . will uphold [asymmetrical
dispute resolution] clauses, irrespective of whether the [unilateral]
option vested in one party is to litigate the dispute or to refer it to
arbitration[. I]n other words, [unilateral] options to litigate and
unilateral options to arbitrate are both valid," and the parties'
agreement will be upheld. 117 Moreover, English courts "[w]ill not
infer from the fact that a dispute resolution clause is 'one-sided'
that the fundamental rights of [the] party that is not entitled to
exercise an election have been infringed." 118
IV. JURISDICTIONS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH ASYMMETRY

A. Bulgaria
"The first time a Bulgarian court had the chance to
adjudicate on the validity and admissibility of unilateral
jurisdictional clauses in Bulgaria was [in] 2011." 119 The clause at
issue was included in "[a] loan agreement concluded between
(natural persons) [,] in an entirely domestic
individuals
situation."1 20 The law governing the loan agreement and the
dispute resolution clause was Bulgarian law.121
The dispute resolution clause provided that the lender could
"initiate proceedings against the borrowers before the Court of
Arbitration at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

116 Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft
v. Liquimar Tankers Mgmt. Inc.,
EWHC 161 [70] (appeal taken from Eng.).
117 See B6rard et al., supra note 6.

118

[2017]

Id.

Ilya Komarevski & Eleonora Mateina, Dispute Resolution: Unilateral Dispute
Resolution Clauses in Bulgaria, IFLR (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.iflr1000.com[NewsAn
dAnalysis/Dispute-Resolution-Unilateral-dispute-resolution-clauses-in-Bulgaria/Index/
4107 [https://perma.ccMF93-HE8J].
120 Gilles Cuniberti, Bulgarian Court Strikes Down One Way Jurisdiction Clause,
CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Nov. 13, 2012), http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/bulgarian-courtstrikes-down-one-way-jurisdiction-clause/ [https://perma.cc/9QNS-HR97].
121 Id.
119
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(BCCI) or any other [arbitral] institution, or before the Regional
Court of Sofia."1 22 "A dispute arose[,] and the lender brought an
action before the Court of Arbitration at BCCI, which . . . found
that it [had jurisdiction] to hear the dispute and ruled that the
borrowers . .. were jointly liable . . .. "123 "The borrowers initiated
proceedings to set aside the [arbitral] award before the Supreme
Court of Cassation[,] claiming that the Court of Arbitration at
BCCI lacked jurisdiction." 1 2 4 "They argued that the arbitration
clause was against good morals [basically, unconscionable and
that it breached the principle of party equality,] a general
principle under Bulgarian civil procedural law." 125
The Supreme Court of Cassation held that "the right of the
lender to choose at its own discretion the [forum] before which to
exercise its right to bring a claim fell within the category of
'potestative rights."' 126 A "potestative" right is "the entitlement of
one person (or a group of persons) to affect unilaterally the legal
position of another person (or a group of persons), where the latter
are obliged to bear . . . the consequences [of the former's
entitlement]." 127 "Examples of potestative rights under Bulgarian
law include the right to divorce [or] the right of cancellation . . . of
a contract." 128 The court held that, "[u]nder Bulgarian law,
potestative rights can be established only ex lege (by law), . . . not
contractually" 129 through an agreement between private parties,
due to their intensity and potentially detrimental effects on third
parties. On this basis:
[T]he court concluded that a clause which in violation of law
entitled one of the parties to unilaterally decide which dispute
resolution body (an arbitration institution or a court) has a
jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute, is void pursuant to
art.26, par.1 of the Bulgarian Contracts and Obligations Act.
.. [a]ccording to [which], all contracts that [are] violating or

123

Id.
Id.

124

Id.

126

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Komarevski & Mateina, supra note 119.

129

Id.

122
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evading the law, as well as all contracts in breach of good
morals, are void.130
The court did not present:
[A]ny legal or . . . theoretical test for determining the
potestative nature of the rights[,] . . . did not comment on the
wording of the clause, the position of the parties, or the type
of clause (for example, unilateral litigation or arbitration or
mixed, one-step or multi-stage) and did not present any other
arguments that could ground the nullity of the unilateral
jurisdictional clauses
or, more broadly, of asymmetrical dispute resolution
clauses.131
This decision warrants two additional observations. First,
although the clause at issue in that case was incorporated in a
purely domestic contract, the court did not emphasize the purely
domestic character of that case. As such, the holding would also be
applicable to an international context, whether or not the dispute
resolution clause is governed by Bulgarian law. 132 Second, the
judgement of the Bulgarian Supreme Court of Cassation is not
binding on other (lower) Bulgarian courts. Consequently, in
Bulgaria, asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses that provide
one of the parties with a unilateral right to decide whether to refer
a dispute to a state court or to an arbitral tribunal are invalid. In
contrast, (symmetrical) dispute resolution clauses that provide for
alternative competences of the courts and arbitrators might be
valid, but such clauses would raise another issue, that of whether
there was mutual intent to arbitrate.

B. China
In China, arbitration is governed by the Chinese Arbitration
Law and by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law that pertain
to arbitration. In addition, the Supreme People's Court uses
judicial interpretations the purpose of which is to guide the lower
courts' application of the law. China is not a UNCITRAL Model
130 Cuniberti, supranote 120.
131 Komarevski & Mateina, supra note 119.
132

See id.
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Law jurisdiction, although Chinese Arbitration Law contains some
of the cornerstone principles relevant to the issue of validity of
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses, such as the principle of
party autonomy and the doctrine of separability of arbitration
agreements.
The issue of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses was
addressed in two interpretations issued by the Supreme People's
Court. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Interpretation of the Supreme
People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of the
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted on

December 26, 2005:
Where the parties concerned agree that they may either apply
to the arbitration institution for arbitration or bring a lawsuit
with people's court for settlement of dispute, the agreement
for arbitration shall be ineffective, unless after one party
applies to the arbitration institution for arbitration, the other
party fails to propose any objection within the period
prescribed. ...

133

Consequently, bilateral dispute resolution clauses allowing
both parties an option between both arbitration and litigation are
invalid ("ineffective") as an arbitration agreement. If the claimant
chooses arbitration and commences arbitral proceedings, the other
party (the respondent) may object. However, failure to object
constitutes implied consent to the arbitration and cures the
invalidity. The clause is nevertheless valid as a (bilateral)
litigation clause.
Moreover, unilateral arbitration clauses are also invalid,
subject to the same exception (the restricted party's failure to
object after the unrestricted party chooses arbitration). However,
the invalidity only concerns the unilateral option for arbitration
and does not extend to the entire dispute resolution clause. As
such, the agreement on a particular jurisdiction remains valid. 134

133 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court Concerning Some Issues on
Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, BEIJING ARB.
COMM'N, http://www.bjac.org.cn/englishl/page/ckzl/htf3.html [https://perma.cc/L8B6-5Y8
E] (last visited May. 1, 2021).
134 See Jiangmen Jiangci Electrician Co., Ltd. v. Yunnan Copper Co., Ltd., Supreme
People's Court, 2013.
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Recently, the Supreme People's Court adopted the Provisions
on Certain Issues related to the Conduct of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Cases, which came into force on January 1, 2018.
Article 14 of this new interpretation provides:
Where, absent the parties' choice of the governing law, a
people's court is to ascertain the law governing the validity of
a foreign-related arbitration agreement . . . , and application
of the law of the place of the arbitral institution or the law of
the seat of arbitration will bring about different results in
respect of the validity of the arbitration agreement, then the
people's court shall apply the law that renders the arbitration
agreement valid. 13 5
In other words, with respect to a foreign-related arbitration
agreement (not domestic), if there is no choice of the law
governing the validity of the arbitration agreement, 136 a court will
examine both "the law of the place of the arbitral institution" and
"the law of the seat of the arbitration" (the lex arbitri). If either
one of these laws admits the validity of the arbitration agreement,
the court will uphold its validity. Because of the new
interpretation, Chinese courts will be more inclined to admit the
validity of unilateral arbitration clauses (or bilateral dispute
resolution clauses granting both parties an option between
arbitration and litigation) included in international contracts.
However, Article 14 of the new interpretation does not apply
to purely domestic contracts, governed entirely by Chinese law
with respect to both the container contract and the arbitration
clause contained therein. In purely domestic situations, unilateral
136 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerningthe Trial
of Judicial Review of Arbitration Cases, CHINA JUSTICE OBSERVER, https://www.chinaj
usticeobserver.com/p/provisions-of-the-spc-on-several-issues-concerning-the-trial-of-jud
icial-review-of-arbitration-cases [https://perma.cc/T7NG-FTMR] (last visited Mar. 4,
2021).
136 Such choice must be express (which is rare in practice). Article 13 of the new
interpretation provides:

Where the parties intend to choose by agreement the law governing the
validity of their foreign-related arbitration agreement, they shall make an
explicit expression to that effect. The fact that the applicable law of the
contract has been agreed upon is not determinative that the same law
governs the validity of the arbitration clause of the contract.
Id.

2021]

TO BE OR NOT TO BE (SYMMETRICAL)

571

arbitration clauses remain governed by Article 7 of the old
interpretation and are very likely to continue to be held invalid.
The recent adoption of the Chinese Civil Code, effective January 1,
2021, does not change this assessment.
"The promulgation of the Civil Code marks the end of ...
decades of efforts to formulate a comprehensive and unified civil
code since 1954. The Civil Code is the most extensive legislation in
the history of [China] and is the first and only legislation named
'code' in China." 1 37 However, the Civil Code does not modify the
legislative framework applicable to arbitration. In particular, it
gross
of
doctrine
of
the
version
a
codifies
13
disparity/unconscionability, 8 a concept relied on by many courts
in other jurisdictions to invalidate unilateral arbitration clauses.

C. India
"The starting point under Indian law is that there must be
mutuality in an arbitration agreement."1 39 In Union of India v.
Bharat Engineering, a case from 1977, "[t]he Delhi High Court
held that [a unilateral] arbitration clause is not valid [as an
arbitration agreement] until the point at which the party exercises
its option to arbitrate[, because,] prior to that [moment], there is a
lack of mutuality"140 and consideration. 141 In reaching its decision,
the court cited cases from the United Kingdom and the United
States, which, at that time, required mutuality. 142 The court
137 Jenny (Jia) Sheng, Chunbin Xu & Wenjun Cai, China Promulgates Its LongAwaited Civil Code, PILLSBURY (June 16, 2020), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/newsand-insights/china-promulgates-civil-code.html#:~:text=China%20has%20passed%20it
s%20first,by%20the%20Supreme%20People%27s [https://perma.cc/8J2T-JF9Y].
138 Specifically, the Civil Code provides that:

[W]here one party takes advantage of the other party that is in a desperate
situation or lacks the ability of making judgment, and as a result the civil
juristic act thus performed is obviously unfair, the damaged party is entitled
to request the people's court or an arbitration institution to revoke the act.
CIVIL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, at art.
151 (May 28, 2020), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/202012/31/con
tent_WS5fedad98c6d0f72576943005.html#:-:text=The%20first%2Chinese%201aw%20
to,effect%20on%20Jan%201%2C%202021 [https://perma.cc/8A7K-AUYA].
139 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27.
140 Id.
141

See Union of India v. Bharat Eng'g Corp., (1977) ILR 499, at
¶¶ 64-65.

142 See id. at

¶¶

20-22 (India).
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further held that once the beneficiary of the option exercises it, a
valid arbitration agreement exists and that, from then onwards,
the principle of mutuality applies, which means that either party
can submit disputes to arbitration. 143 As such, the clause becomes,
to a certain extent, bilateral.
The relevant arbitration clause had been concluded between
a contractor and a railway. On its face, the clause only entitled the
contractor to submit disputes to arbitration.1 44 The court started
its legal analysis by noting that the ambiguity of the clause
"makes two interpretations possible: either the clause means, as
the contractor says, that only he can demand a reference; or, as is
contended by the Railway, that both parties can invoke it" and
that the legal question is whether "there can be an arbitration
agreement reserving the right of reference to only one party ...
[fJor, if there cannot be an arbitration agreement of that kind, the
only way of sustaining the clause is by construing it as conferring
bilateral rights." 145 The court then relied on the definition of an
arbitration agreement contained in the Arbitration Act, "a written
agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration,"
and observed:
[T]he agreement to "submit" must be presently subsisting, or
else there is no arbitration agreement. The definition does not
contemplate a contingent agreement or an agreement to agree

in the future. As to the latter, it is well settled that "a
contract to enter into a contract, is not a contract known to
the law .

143

.

.. "146

Id.at 168.

144 See id. at ¶ 7 ("In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties
hereto as to the construction of operation of this contract or the respective rights and
liabilities of the parties, on any matter in question, dispute or difference on any
account, or as to the withholding by the Railway of any certificate to which the
contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Railway fails to make a decision within
a reasonable time, then and in any such case, . . . the Contractor, after 90 days of his
presenting his final claim on disputed matters, may demand in writing that the dispute
or difference be referred to arbitration, such demand for arbitration shall specify the
matters which are in question dispute or difference, and only such dispute or difference
of which the demand has been made and no other, shall be referred to arbitration.")
(quotations omitted).
145 Id. at ¶ 13.
146 Id. at ¶ 15 (citations omitted).
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Interestingly, the court analyzed the notion of a "contingent
contract," defined under ordinary contract law as "a contract to do
or not to do something if some event, collateral to such contract,
does or does not happen."14 7 Indian contract law provides that
"[c]ontracts which are contingent on the happening of a future
uncertain event cannot be enforced unless and until that event
has happened, and, if the event becomes impossible, such
contracts become void." 148 As such, "a contingent contract is
unenforceable until the condition on which it ' depends is
fulfilled." 149 Until then, "it is strictly not even a 'contract,' [defined
as] 'an agreement enforceable by law."'150 The court concluded: "A
'contingent' arbitration agreement would not, therefore, be a
'present' contract. But this ... is the sine qua non of an arbitration
agreement. It follows that a 'contingent' agreement cannot be an
'arbitration agreement' in law." 151 Stated differently, "an
arbitration agreement must be a present agreement, and the
reciprocal promises it comprises must not be contingent,"15 2 and
"the law does not contemplate an arbitration agreement which is
contingent or conditional or confers an option."15 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the court also noted that "[i]n an arbitration
agreement[,] the consideration for the promise of each party is the
reciprocal promise of the other" and that, without a reciprocal
promise to submit the differences to arbitration, the unilateral
15 4
promise made by one party would lack consideration.
As applied to the case that was before the Delhi High Court,
these principles led the court to decide that the contractor could
validly submit its claims to arbitration (because a valid
arbitration agreement existed once the contractor had exercised
the unilateral option) but that the railway could not submit its
counter-claims to arbitration because the contractor had only

Id. at 1 17.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
-

147

148
149
110

161 Id.
162
153
154

Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id. at $¶ 20-22.
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consented to arbitration with respect to the contractor's own
claims. 155 Specifically, the court held:
Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract is so
formulated as to constitute a contract of option. It says, the
contractor "may demand" a reference to arbitration. Nothing
is said about a demand by the Railway. Furthermore, the
demand by the contractor must "specify the matters which
are in question dispute or difference." A reference is
permissible in respect of them alone "and no other."

[T]he moment the contractor invokes the clause (thereby
exercising his option) an arbitration agreement exists in
respect of the dispute specified by him. From then onward the
principle of mutuality applies. Either party can now make the
reference. If, after electing for arbitration, the contractor
refrains from making a reference, the Railway may do so.
That is the practical consequence of mutuality. But the
arbitration agreement is restricted to the disputes regarding
which the contractor made the "demand." Here, the contractor
sought arbitration only for his own claims. The order of
reference that he obtained was restricted to those. At no time
did he require or consent to a reference of the counter-claims
of the Railway to arbitration. So there exists no arbitration
agreement under which they can be referred. The petition of
the Railway under section 20 of the Arbitration Act could not,
1
therefore, have been allowed. 56
In New India Assurance Co. v. Central Bank of India, a case
from 1984, the Calcutta High Court upheld the validity of a
unilateral arbitration clause. 157 The court "expressly declined to
adopt the reasoning of the Delhi High Court and held that a
unilateral arbitration clause constitutes a valid arbitration
agreement from the outset, albeit enforceable only by the party
with an option to arbitrate." 158

166
156

Id. at ¶T 67-69.
Id. at ¶¶ 67-69.

157 See New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1985 Cal. 76
(1984) (India).
158 See Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27.
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In conclusion, because caselaw is inconsistent, the status of
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses in India is unclear.1 59
This uncertainty can be resolved only by the Supreme Court of
India or by the legislature.1 60 "Although not dealing with the point
directly, more recent cases indicate that Indian courts are
comfortable with some asymmetry between the parties' rights in
arbitration clauses." 16 1 In 2017, in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering
Projects, the Supreme Court of India "reiterated that a clause
entitling one party to appoint an arbitrator alone[,] without the
input of the other[,] is valid."16 2 Similarly, also in 2017, the High
Court of Judicature in Bombay, when dealing "with a clause
whereby one party was solely entitled to appoint the arbitrator,"
did not perform an analysis regarding "whether that aspect of the
clause was valid." 6 3 Therefore, recent cases suggest "that Indian
courts might permit some asymmetry in arbitration clauses, [but]
the position is far from settled."1 64

D. Poland
The Polish arbitration law (2005) is included in the Polish
Code of Civil Procedure. Poland is a UNCITRAL Model Law
jurisdiction. However, under Article 1161(2) of the Polish Code of
Civil Procedure, clauses which entitle one party only to bring a
claim before an arbitration tribunal or a court violate the principle
of equality of the parties and, as such, are "ineffective."165 It is still
unclear what "ineffective" means, and what are the consequences
of including such a clause, as there is no case directly on point
yet.166
Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. (citing TRF Ltd. v. Energo Eng'g Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 (India)).
159

163 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27 (citing Dbm Geotechnics v. Bharat Petroleum
Corp., (2017) 5 ABR 674 (India)).
164 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27.
Ise See Bartosz Kruzewski & Adelina Prokop, Unilateral Option Clauses in
ArbitrationAgreements, INT'L L. OFFICE (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.internationallawo
ffice.comNewsletters/Arbitration-ADR/Poland/Clifford-Chance/Unilateral-optionclauses-in-arbitration-agreements [https://perma.cc/5NNN-5RMP].
166 But see Draguiev, supra note 67, at 32 ("The Supreme Court of Poland reviewed
a unilateral clause and considered that it may be void on grounds that the different
options granted to the parties may impact their standing in the procedure (e.g., with
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There are three main ways of interpreting Article 1161(2) of
the Polish Code of Civil Procedure that could be adopted by the
Polish courts. First, an asymmetrical dispute resolution clause
might be considered ineffective only insofar as it prohibits a party
(the restricted party) from enjoying a similar range of choices for
taking the claim to litigation or arbitration as the unrestricted
party. Second, the asymmetrical portion of the clause might be
struck down, such that the party that had the unilateral right (the
unrestricted party) would be deprived of it, which would leave
both parties with just the bilateral default option (in favor of
litigation or arbitration). Third, the inclusion of a unilateral right
might lead to the invalidity of the entire dispute resolution clause.
In such a case, either party could bring a dispute before any
competent courts, as there would be no dispute resolution clause.
It should be noted that the first draft version of Article
1161(2) provided that, in cases of violation of the principle of
equality of the parties, the arbitration agreement would be
"invalid." However, this was later changed to "ineffective", which
could be an argument against the entire arbitration agreement
being considered invalid. 167

E. Romania
In Romania, domestic arbitration is governed by Book IV of
the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, while international
arbitration is governed by Book VII (Title IV) of the Romanian
Code of Civil Procedure. There are no express provisions regarding
the validity of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses in either
set of regulations. Such clauses are not often encountered in
Romanian legal practice or caselaw. 168 Instead, bilateral
(symmetrical) clauses, giving each of the right to choose either to
arbitrate or to litigate have been used in practice and analyzed by

respect to choice of arbitrators, which may be more beneficial to one party in a given
arbitral institution compared to another, which one of the other parties is not allowed
to turn to under the unilateral clause.") (citations omitted).
167 See Kruzewski & Prokop, supra note 165.
168 See Andreea Ghio, Romania's BilateralArbitrationOption Clause: A Binding or
Non-binding ArbitrationMechanism?, SCHOENHERR (Jan. 17, 2017), http://roadmap20l
7.schoenherr.eu/romanias-bilateral-arbitration-option-clause-a-binding-or-non-bindingarbitration-mechanism/ [https://perma.cc/CY7P-M6M8].
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arbitral tribunals and courts. 169 Arbitration practice shows a
predilection for interpreting dispute resolution clauses with a
(bilateral) option to arbitrate in the sense that they are valid,
while national courts are undecided.
With respect to such bilateral clauses, arbitral tribunals
found "that the intention of the parties to resort to arbitration,
even as an option, is enough to find that an arbitration agreement
exists[,] and that it binds the parties to arbitration"1 70 and that "to
subject the commencement of arbitration to a distinct agreement
between the signatories would mean depriving the option clause of
its effects[, and, consequently, that] as soon as the claimant files a
request for arbitration, the arbitration clause should be considered
effective." 171
In contrast, Romanian courts took a different approach.
Lower Romanian courts refused enforcement of an arbitral award
issued on the basis of an option (bilateral) clause, reasoning that,
because an "option clause does not irrefutably exclude the
jurisdiction of the national courts, it does not represent an
effective arbitration agreement."1 72 For example, an appellate
court held in 2014:
[T]he arbitration agreement must unequivocally show the
parties' intent to submit their future disputes to arbitration
[and that] a clause whereby the parties agreed that future
disputes may be solved either by arbitration before the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Bacau or by litigation

Id.
Id. (citing Award no. 283 dated Nov. 25, 2009 rendered by the Court of
International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Romania).
171 Id. (citing Award no. 233 dated Nov. 16, 2007 rendered by the Court of
International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Romania,; Award no. 49 dated Mar. 9, 2010 rendered by the Court of
International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Romania; Award no. 124 dated July 22, 2009 rendered by the Court of
International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Romania; Award no. 145 dated Dec. 27, 1996 rendered by the Court of
International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Romania).
169

170

172

Id.
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before national courts is not unequivocal, because it does not
exclude the default jurisdiction of national courts. 173
However, in 2016, the Supreme Court of Romania held that a
bilateral option clause is not void. 174 The case involved a dispute
between Spitalul Judefean de Urgentd Sf. Pantelimon Focgani
(claimant) and Casa de Asigurdri de Sdnatate Vrancea
(respondent). 175 The contract between the parties contained a
bilateral option clause, whereby each of the parties could bring a
claim either before the Bucharest Central Arbitration Commission
or before national courts. 176 The claimant chose to commence
litigation before Romanian courts (Vrancea District Court).17 7 The
Vrancea District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute and the dispute was remanded and adjudicated by the
Bucharest Central Arbitration Commission, which issued an
arbitral award in 2013.178 The claimant (presumably because it
lost in arbitration) then brought annulment proceedings against
the arbitral award, arguing that there was no agreement to
arbitrate. 179
The Court of Appeal Galati declined to annul the arbitral
award, finding that there was a valid arbitration clause.1 80 The
Supreme Court of Romania confirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeal Galati. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Romania held
that "despite its obvious deficiency, an alternative arbitration
clause [i.e., one that gives both parties an option between
arbitration and litigation] is not null and void, and shall be
interpreted pursuant to the general provisions applicable to

173 Id. (citing Bacau Court of Appeal, Decision no. 3259 of Oct. 16, 2014). See also
Art. 553, C. Proc. Civ., titled "Exclusion of Court Jurisdiction": "The conclusion of the
arbitral agreement excludes, for the disputes that are within the scope of the
arbitration agreement, the jurisdiction of the courts." (author's translation). In our
view, the Romanian court misapplied this provision, which deals with the effects of a
(valid) arbitration agreement, and not with the conditions needed for the validity of an
arbitration agreement.
174 See Supreme Court of Romania, Decision no. 318 of Feb. 11, 2016.

178

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

179

Id.

180

Id.

176
176
177
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contract interpretation." 181 Consequently, whenever such a clause
is present, "exercising one option or another [i.e., arbitration or
litigation] is subordinated, pursuant to the principle of contract
supremacy, to there being a subsequent agreement between the
parties, in favor of either arbitration or litigation." 1 82 The principle
of contract supremacy, which is codified in the Romanian Civil
Code, provides that "legally concluded contracts have the same
effects as the law between the parties."18 3
The Supreme Court of Romania then went on to note that the
claimant, despite initially filing the dispute before national courts,
had not contested the decision of the Vrancea District Court
(which declined jurisdiction in favor of arbitration) nor challenged
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (which found that there
was a valid arbitration agreement and proceeded to adjudicate the
case and issue a final arbitral award).1 84 As such, the Supreme
Court of Romania found that the claimant had impliedly agreed
(subsequently) to the dispute being resolved by arbitration. 185
Legal scholars interpreted this decision to mean that
bilateral option clauses are valid. 186 However, this is an improper
reading of the decision. If the validity of the initial agreement of
the parties (that each of them has the right to choose either to
arbitrate or to litigate) is dependent on a subsequent agreement
being reached between the parties, then there was no agreement
to begin with and, as such, the bilateral option for arbitration
produces no effects (or, pursuant to Romanian terminology, is
invalid because it does not contain a "binding" agreement to
arbitrate that would remove jurisdiction of the national courts).
The Supreme Court of Romania essentially required that
there be an agreement to arbitrate, either at the time of contract
formation or subsequently, which corresponds to the typical two
ways in which parties can agree to arbitration either directly in
their contract via an arbitration clause or later, when a dispute

182

Id.
Id.

183

Art. 1270, C. Civ.

181

184

See Supreme Court of Romania, Decision no. 318 of Feb. 11, 2016.

185

Id.

186

See, e.g., Ramona Elisabeta Cirlig, Arbitraj. Clauza CompromisorieAlternativ.

Nulitate. Exercitarea Opyiunii Asupra Competentei,
JURISPRUDENTA (2017); GhitA, supra note 168.

1

REVISTA

ROMANA

DE
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arises via a separate submission agreement.1 87 Under Romanian
law, an agreement to arbitrate must be in writing. 188 However, the
2016 decision of the Supreme Court of Romania seems to indicate
that such agreement could be tacit, based on the subsequent
behavior of the parties (which includes the possibility that it
would not be in writing). In fact, the court relied on the absence of
writings (no challenge to the decision of the Vrancea District
Court or of the arbitral tribunal by the claimant) to find that the
claimant had agreed to arbitration (whereas the claimant had
actually initially exercised its option right in favor of litigation,
not arbitration).
Even more problematic, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Romania, despite its laudable pro-arbitration approach, does not
provide any guidance to practitioners drafting bilateral option
clauses, nor a solution to situations when the first party to
exercise its option persists in its attempt to obtain enforcement of
the option (contrary to the claimant in the 2016 litigation).
Finally, this decision is limited to bilateral option clauses. As
such, uncertainty persists under Romanian law regarding
unilateral clauses (unilateral arbitration clauses and unilateral
litigation clauses). As for unilateral arbitration clauses, which
have not been yet analyzed by Romanian courts, it is very unlikely
that they will be considered invalid, for the same reasons that
bilateral option clauses for arbitration were found invalid (or, at
least, were found to require an additional agreement to be
effective) and for the additional reason that they violate party
equality in that they represent a bilateral commitment to
arbitrate.

F. Russia
Before 2012, Russian courts "were guided by the decisions of
the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Moscow Circuit rendered in a
series of disputes initiated by financial institutions under relevant

187 See Art. 549, C. Proc. Civ.
188 Same requirement as Article 7 (option I) UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration. U.N. COMM'N ON IN'L TRADE LAW, supra note
17, art. 7 at 4.
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facility agreements." 18 9 "The agreements contained [a bilateral]
arbitration clause and also provided for the right of the creditor to
initiate proceedings in the courts of England or any other
appropriate jurisdiction"1 90 (unilateral litigation clause). The
"creditors initiated actions before the Arbitrazh Court of
Moscow." 19 1 "The defendants requested that the [court]
the]
arbitration
referencing
[terminated,
proceedings be
192
"Although the courts of first instance in some of the
clauses."
cases upheld the defendants' approach and terminated the
proceedings, the higher courts . . . confirmed the validity of the
unilateral [litigation] clauses" and considered the claims on the
merits." 193. Moreover, the higher courts emphasized "that a party
bearing financial risks (a creditor) is lawfully vested with the right
to choose" between the dispute resolution options contained in the
agreement. 194
In 2012, this approach changed as a result of the decision in
the Sony Ericsson case.1 95 In this case, the Presidium of the
Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation (a state court,
not an arbitral institution, known under its Russian acronym:
"VAS") held that a unilateral litigation clause was contrary to
Russian law because it gave one party an unfair advantage over
the other (the clause contained a standard arbitration clause and,
additionally, gave only to one party the option to litigate) and,
therefore, violated the equality of arms principle stated in Article

189 Alexander Gridasov & Maria Dolotova, Unilateral Option Clauses: Russian
Supreme Court Puts an End to the Long-Lasting Discussion, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May
7, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/05/07/unilateral-option-clau
ses-russian-supreme-court-puts-an-end-to-the-long-lasting-discussion/ [https://perma.cc
/G3DG-PH9X].
Id.
191 Id.
190
192

Id.

Id.
Id. See also PERtNYIOVA, supra note 32 (citing Red Barn Cap, LLK v. Zao
Factoring Company Eurocommerz, Russian Federal Arbitration Court, case no. A4059745/09-63-478, Dec. 28, 2009 (the court confirmed the validity of a unilateral
litigation clause)).
195 See Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VAS RF ot 19 iyun' g. No. 1831/12 [Ruling of the
Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012,
198

194

No.

1831/12], VESTNIK VYSSHEGO

ARBITRAZHNOGO

SUDA ROSSIISKOI

FEDERATSII

[VESTNIK VAS RF] [Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation] 2012, p. 6.
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Arbitration (identical to Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration). 196
More specifically, the "case concerned an action initiated by a
Russian entity, Russkaya Telefonnaya Kompaniya (RTK), against
a Russian subsidiary of Sony Ericsson over the quality of mobile
phones supplied to RTK."197 "The dispute resolution clause
provided for all disputes to be resolved by ICC arbitration in
London, with an option vested [(only)] in Sony Ericsson to apply to
a court of competent jurisdiction" 198 in respect of claims for
outstanding payments owed to it. The dispute resolution clause
read:
Any dispute arising in connection with this Agreement ... is
to be finally resolved in accordance with the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the InternationalChamber of
Commerce . . . . The arbitration clause does not restrict Sony
Ericsson's rights to file with a court of a competent
jurisdiction a claim for recovery of debts for supplied
Products.199
Subsequently, RTK filed a claim with the Arbitrazh Court of
Moscow (a state court), seeking delivery of replacement goods,
although the clause did not enable RTK to commence litigation. 200
The Arbitrazh Court of Moscow dismissed the claim, based on the
existence of the bilateral arbitration agreement contained in the
dispute resolution clause, as requested by the foreign party, Sony
Ericson. 20 1 Due to the arbitration agreement, the court concluded
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. 202 The conclusion
of the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow "was upheld at the next two
levels of appeal, first by the Appellate Arbitrazh Court [of Moscow
196

Id.

197 Gridasov & Dolotova, supra note 189.
198

Id.

See Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VAS RF ot 19 iyun' g. No. 1831/12 [Ruling of the
Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012,
No. 1831/12], VESTNIK VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA RoSsIISKoI FEDERATSII
[VESTNIK VAS RF] [Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation] 2012, p. 3. (emphasis in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
200 Id.
201 Id.
199

202 Id.
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and then by the] Federal Arbitrazh Court . . . of Moscow .... "203
Both appellate courts confirmed "previous practice of Russian
courts that the parties' contractual agreement should be
upheld." 204
RTK appealed these decisions with the VAS and RTK's
appeal was based on a violation of the principle of procedural
equality of the parties. 205 The Presidium of the VAS set all
previous court rulings aside and remanded the case to the court of
first instance because the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause
violated the principle of equality of the parties and was therefore
invalid insofar as it granted the right to refer a dispute to a state
court to one party but not to the other. 206 The Presidium of the
VAS then held that the restricted party should have the
commence litigation before a competent court and enjoy equal
rights as the other party.207 Effectively, the holding of the
Presidium of the VAS converted the unilateral right of Sony
Ericsson to have recourse to litigation into a bilateral right. Stated
differently, asymmetrical jurisdiction clause was transformed into
a symmetrical jurisdiction clause, in order for the clause to be
compliant under Russian law. The result was that both parties
were entitled to bring claims before the Russian courts, which
effectively meant that the Russian claimant (RTK) was allowed to
start court proceedings (as it had done).
Since the 2012 decision in Sony Ericsson by the Presidium of
the VAS, Russian courts took different approaches on this issue.
One explanation for the contradictory approaches resides in the
fact that the VAS was abolished in 2015 and the matters
previously under the authority of VAS were transferred to the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 208 The prevailing view
was to follow the ruling.in the Sony Ericsson case by holding that

203

See Bdrard et al., supra note 6.

204

Id.

206 See Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VAS RF ot 19 iyun' g. No. 1831/12 [Ruling of the
Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012,
No. 1831/12], VESTNIK VYSSHEGo ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII
[VESTNIK VAS RF] [Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation] 2012.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See Gridasov & Dolotova, supra note 189.
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unilateral litigation or arbitration clauses are invalid and that
they should be interpreted as giving bilateral rights to the parties,
"so that both parties (when acting as a claimant) have similar
rights to choose between arbitration and state courts." 209
Exceptions existed. Some courts validated unilateral litigation or
arbitration clauses. Other courts invalidated such clauses in full,
without interpreting them as giving symmetrical rights to the
parties.
In the 2014 case Novokuznetsky v. UMO, the court refused to
enforce an arbitral award rendered under a unilateral arbitration
clause. 210 Pursuant to the dispute resolution clause at issue in
that case, one party had the choice between litigation or
arbitration, while the other party could only arbitrate. 211
"Referring to the Sony Ericsson case, the court concluded that the
unilateral [arbitration] clause was invalid, as violating the
equality of the parties. The court [did not] further substantiate the
particular legal grounds under which it found the award
unenforceable." 212 Presumably, the relevant ground was violation
of public policy. Moreover, the court did not interpret the clause as
giving symmetrical rights to the parties. 21 3
In the 2015 case Piramidav. BOT, the Chamber on Economic
Disputes of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
considered a bilateral dispute resolution clause, giving the
claimant the right to choose between litigation and arbitration.214
In that case, two Russian entities, Piramida LLC (supplier) and
BOT LLC (buyer) entered into a Supplier Contract. A Contract of

209 See, e.g., Petit et al., supra note 3, at 26; Gridasov & Dolotova, supra note 189.
See also Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Determination of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation of June 7, 2016], BIULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF [BVS]
[Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 2016, No. 305-OC16-7033
(holding that unilateral litigation clause where only one party has the choice between
litigation or arbitration and the other party may only arbitrate is void as such).
210 See Gridasov & Dolotova, supra note 189.
211 Id.

212

Id.

Id. (noting that the "court also found that the counterparty (UMO) was not
properly notified about the arbitration hearing").
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Determination of the Supreme
214 See Verkhovnogo
Court of the Russian Federation of May 27, 2015], BIULLETEN' VERKHoVNoGo SUDA RF
[BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 2015, No. 310-3C14213
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Guarantee was also concluded between Piramida LLC and Mr.
Babkin, pursuant to which, if the buyer failed to pay for the goods
supplied, Mr. Babkin agreed to pay.21 5
Section 10.3 of the Supplier Contract provided:
Any dispute arising in connection with this contract is to be
finally resolved by the Commercial Court of Ulanovsk region
[a state court] or by the arbitration court of the Chamber of
Commerce of Ulanovsk region depending on the choice of a
claimant. 216
Section 4.2 of the Contract of Guarantee provided: "[T]he
dispute should be finally resolved by the Dimitrovogradsky City
Court [a state court] or by the arbitration court of the Chamber of
Commerce of Ulanovsk region depending on the choice of a
claimant." 217 As such, "the parties agreed to refer the disputes
either to arbitration or to a state court, with [the] claimant having
218
a right to choose between arbitration and litigation."
When BOT LLC breached the Supplier Contract by failing to
make the payment, Piramida LLC commenced arbitration against
both BOT LLC and Mr. Babkin. 219 The arbitral award was in favor
of Piramida LLC (the claimant) but because the respondents failed
to comply with the award voluntarily, Piramida LLC was
obligated to seek enforcement. 220 The Arbitration Court of
Smolensk region (a state court) relied on the Sony Ericsson
decision and invalidated the unilateral arbitration clause
(although the Sony Ericsson case was about a unilateral litigation

Id.
216 Aleksandra Orzel, A Few Remarks on Enforceability of Unilateral Dispute
Resolution Clauses Involving Arbitration, in Klidra Drlikovi & Tereza KyselovskA
(eds.), COFOLA INTERNATIONAL 2016: RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES PUBLIC
216

LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION CRISIS, 117, 126, n. 32.
217 Id.

218 Mikahil Samoylov, The Evolution of Unilateral Arbitration Clauses, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2015), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/01/the76
.0316
evolution-of-unilateral-arbitration-clauses-in-russia/?doingwp_cron=15923029
419601440429687500 [https://perma.cc/SGH4-PYUP].
219 See Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Determination of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation of May 27, 2015], BIULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF
[BVS] [Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 2015, No. 310-9C145919.
220 Id.
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clause). 221 Consequently, the motion for the enforcement of the
arbitral award was rejected. The court of cassation upheld the
ruling. 222
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation overturned the
previous decisions and found that there was no violation of the
principle of equality, noting that the lower courts had
misinterpreted the Sony Ericsson case. 223 In our view, that was
because, in the Sony Ericsson case, the name of the party with an
option between arbitration and litigation (Sony Ericsson) was
indicated directly and nominally, which had led to the ruling, by
VAS, that the principle of equality was violated. In contrast, in the
Piramida case, the holder of the option was not mentioned by
name but by the procedural posture (the wording of the clause
was: "depending on the choice of a claimant"). On remand,
enforcement of the arbitral award in the Piramida case was
granted by the Arbitration Court of Smolensk region. 224
This Piramidacase indicated that the Supreme Court would
follow the approach adopted in the Sony Ericsson case by the
abolished VAS, namely that unilateral arbitration or jurisdiction
clauses are invalid under Russian law, except where they provide
that the right to exercise the option to litigate or arbitrate belongs
generically to the claimant, as opposed to being granted to a
named party. A similar distinction was made by German courts
(see Part V.2 below). Another possible reading of the Piramida
case is that Russian courts would adopt a more flexible approach
in cases concerning unilateral arbitration clauses (as opposed to
unilateral litigation clauses) because unilateral arbitration
clauses that supplement bilateral forum selection clauses do not

221

Id.

222

Id.
223 Id.

224 See Dmitry Vlasov, Russian Supreme Court Upholds the Validity of Optional
Dispute Resolution Clause, PRACTIcAL LAw (Oct. 14, 2015) (citing the following cases
which confirmed the validity of optional dispute resolution clauses in Russia:
Resolution of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation dated June 8,
2007, no. 6920/07, case no. A32-8964/2006; Resolution of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court
of the Russian Federation dated March 27, 2012, no. BAC-1943/12, case A40-57887/11;
Judgment of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation
dated Feb. 14, 2012, no. 11196/11, case A75-1836/2011).
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raise issues of access to the default system for dispute resolution:
jurisdiction of national courts.
The next relevant case is the 2016 case Emerging Markets v.
Zhilindustriya.225 This case involved a loan agreement granted by
a foreign creditor to a Russian entity (Zhilindustriya). The loan
agreement was secured by guarantees provided by a number of
Russian companies. 226 The relevant loan agreement and the
guarantees were governed by English law. 227 "Under the dispute
resolution clauses[,] the disputes were to be submitted to the
[London Court of International Arbitration], but the lender had an
option to submit them to a court in England, Russia or any other
competent jurisdiction" 228 (unilateral litigation clause). The
borrower defaulted and the lender commenced court proceedings
against the debtor and the guarantors in order to recover the
loan. 229 The proceedings were brought before the Arbitrazh Court
of Moscow (a state court), the place of residence of one of the
respondents. 230 The respondents raised the lack of competence of
the state court and requested that the case be referred to
arbitration. 231
The Arbitrazh Court of Moscow and the appellate court ruled
that the dispute resolution clause violated the principle of
procedural equality, due to the fact that the clause gave only one
of the parties the option to choose between arbitration and
litigation. In so ruling, the courts refused to apply English law in
order to validate the optionality feature of the dispute resolution
clause, despite the fact that English law was the applicable law to
both the loan and the guarantees and to the dispute resolution. 232
The rationale of the courts in dismissing the respondent's
argument that the clause was valid under the law chosen by the
225 Emerging Markets Structured Products B.V. v. Zhilindustriya LLC et al.,
Appellate Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, case no. A40-125181/2013 (Mar. 14, 2016).
226 Id.
227 Id.

228 Arbitration and Cross-Border Litigation in Russia: Arbitration, DOUBLE BRIDGE
LAW DIGEST (Mar. 2016), http://doublebridgelaw.comlwp-content/uploads/2016/04/DBLArbitration-Digest.-Issue-4-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNZ2-HJMG].
229 Id.
230 Emerging Markets Structured Products B.V. v. Zhilindustriya LLC et al.,
Appellate Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, case no. A40-125181/2013 (Mar. 14, 2016).

231 Id.
232

Id.
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parties (English law) was that "because the relevant practice of
Russian courts rests on the provisions of international law, it
overrides the parties' choice of English law." 233 Consequently, the
courts declared the entire dispute resolution clause invalid,
referring to the Sony Ericsson case. 2 34 Because the entire dispute
resolution clause was invalid, under the general rules of
jurisdiction, 235 the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, where the lender
had brought the claim, had jurisdiction, because it was the place
of residence of one of the respondents. 236 The lender's claim was
then granted in full. 237 The Supreme Court refused to reconsider
the case. 238
In December 2018, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation issued a Digest of Court Practice Relating
to Judicial Assistance and Control over Domestic and
International Arbitration. 239 Although the "Digest does not
formally have precedential value, it provides valuable guidance to
the approach that the Russian courts will likely pursue in relation
to [the legal matters addressed]."240
Section 6 of the Digest basically restates the holding of the
Piramidacase, by noting:
The laws of Russian Federation allow dispute resolution
clauses that provide the right of a claimant to defer his
claims, at his discretion, either to [state courts] or
international commercial arbitration . . . . A provision in a
dispute resolution clause that grants claimant a right to
choose between going to court or to arbitration is not
disproportionate, because it does not entitle a certain party of
the contract (a specific party) to such a choice, but merely
state that the claimant is the holder of the right to choose,
provided that any party of the contract, both the promisor and

233 Usoskin et al., Courts and Arbitrationin Russia, RAA40 (2017), http://cisarbitrat
ion.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/RAA40-Newsletter-No-7-2017.pdf [https://perma.c
c/B7NL-RMZD].
234 Id.
235 Id.

236 See Gridasov & Dolotova, supra note 189.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.

240 Id.
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the promisee, can become claimant in a dispute . . . . The
wording "subject to claimant's choice" is a usual one in such
contracts and does not violate the balance of parties' rights
and equality of their procedural rights. Such a clause gives
both parties the right to submit the dispute either to courts,
or to arbitration. 241
However, Section 7 of the Digest reiterates the holding of the
Sony Ericssoncase, and notes:
A dispute resolution clause containing an alternative choicethe solution of a dispute by courts or by arbitration-and
asserting the right to go to courts for one party only is invalid
inasmuch as it denies the other party the right to go to courts.
In such a case, each of the parties has the right to go both to
242
courts, and to arbitration.
The language only covers unilateral litigation clauses (not
also unilateral arbitration clauses), and the solution only applies
where a specific party (as opposed to the claimant) has an option,
and not the other party. In such a situation, the unilateral option
is interpreted as bilateral, giving both parties (depending on who
is the claimant) the right to start legal proceedings in court.
As such, the Digest notes:
The principles of an adversarial system and of procedural
equality provide for the allocation of equal procedural
opportunities for each party to defend its rights and
legitimate interests. As such, according to the general
principles of the protection of civil rights, a dispute resolution
clause cannot grant only one party (the seller) the right to
submit the dispute to the competent court and deny the other
party (the buyer) such a right. In such a case, the
disadvantaged party is allowed to recourse to any of the
means available to the other party, according to the dispute
resolution clause. Because the first party has the opportunity
to choose between submitting the dispute to courts or to

241 Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Digest of Case Law
Involving Judicial Assistance and Oversight in Relation to Domestic and International
Arbitration (Dec. 28, 2018), http://www.supcourt.ru [https://perma.ccIY2N2-65FG], p.
12, par. 6-7.
242 Id. at p. 14.
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international commercial arbitration, the second party is
entitled to the same rights of resolving the dispute. As a
consequence, the party whose rights have been violated by
such a clause is also entitled to address to the competent
court, having enforced its right to juridical assistance on the
24 3
same terms as its counterpart.

Given the terminology employed, and the final conclusion
("the party whose rights have been violated by such a clause is
also entitled to address to the competent court"), which seem to
apply solely to unilateral litigation clauses, it remains unclear
whether or not unilateral arbitration clauses would be considered
invalid or valid. Some legal authors have interpreted the Digest to
apply to both types of unilateral clauses, in the sense of rendering

them bilateral.244
It also remains unclear from the Digest (with respect to
unilateral litigation clauses granting one party the right to opt
between international arbitration and a specific court, as opposed
to any court that has jurisdiction, and assuming that the
unilateral part is interpreted as bilateral) whether the other
party, the restricted party, would have the right to refer disputes
only to the specified court or to other competent courts as well.
In conclusion, uncertainty persists in Russia despite (or
because) of the December 2018 Digest with respect to
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses (unilateral litigation
clauses or unilateral arbitration clauses). Such clauses will
continue to be problematic when inserted in contracts with
Russian parties, especially where enforcement might be sought in
Russia. The main potential outcomes are: (1) asymmetrical
dispute resolution clauses would be validated, by interpreting the
unilateral option part as bilateral; (2) asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses would be invalidated in full, without the
unilateral option part being interpreted as bilateral; or (3) only
the unilateral option part would be invalidated, while the bilateral
option (for litigation or for arbitration) would. be given full effect.
243 Id.

24 See Clifford Chance, Supreme Court of the RF Issues Digest of Case Law on the
Issues of Arbitration, CLIFFORDCHANCE.COM (Feb. 2019), https://www.cliffordchance.
com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2019/02/supreme-court-of-the-rf-issues-digestof-case-law-on-the-issues-of-arbitration-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UU3-HKSM].
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G. Turkey
Turkey is a UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdiction. Under
Turkish law (Turkish Civil Procedure Law for domestic
arbitrations and Turkish International Arbitration Law for
international arbitrations), courts require "an absolute intent to
arbitrate" for the validity of arbitration clauses, and pay
particular attention to the terminology used in the drafting of the
clause.245
In 2011, the Court of Cassation held that a unilateral
arbitration clause (a clause which gave to only one party the right
to initiate both litigation and domestic arbitration, while the other
party was restricted to litigation) was invalid. 246 More specifically,
plaintiff was the owner of a ship who signed a Rescue Assistance
Agreement with the defendant, who was a municipality. 247 The
Rescue Assistance Agreement provided for the unilateral
arbitration clause, in favor of the defendant. During the rescue
mission, the defendant's Coastal Police Department caused
damages to the ship. Consequently, the owner of the ship started
court litigation to recover damages and reimbursement of the
assistance fee it had paid to the defendant. 248 The defendant
moved for dismissal of the case arguing, among others, that the
court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute due to the
Assistance
the Rescue
in
included
clause
arbitration
Agreement. 249 The court of first instance agreed with the
defendant, and dismissed the case, holding that the dispute
should be settled by arbitration. 250 The Court of Cassation

245 See, e.g., Court of Cassation, 15th Civil Law Division, May 22, 2015, Decision no.
2015/2198-2758; Court of Cassation, 15th Civil Law Division, July 1, 2014, Decision no.
2014/3330-4607; Court of Cassation, 19th Civil Law Division, May 29, 2012, Decision
no. 2012/4065-9080; Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Law Division, Apr. 13, 2006,
Decision no. 2005/4053-4040; Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Law Division, Apr. 12,
2005, Decision no. 2004/6686-3600; Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Law Division, June
10, 2002, Decision no. 2002/2228-5894.
246 See Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27 (citing Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Law
Division, Feb, 15, 2011, Decision no. 2011/1675).
247 Id.
248

Id.

249 Id.
250 Id.
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overturned the decision, and ruled that the arbitration clause was
invalid due to its unilateral character. 25 1
The court cited reasons of due process and the right to be
heard. [The court noted that] the party with the right to go to
arbitration could bar state court proceedings by invoking the
arbitration clause, while the other party could not have
recourse to arbitration at all. The court also held that the
intent to arbitrate was not clear and absolute [because] the
agreement allowed one party to initiate both litigation and
arbitration.

252

In 2016, the Court of Cassation recognized the validity of an
asymmetrical forum selection clause. 25 3 The clause in question
"gave one of the parties the right to bring proceedings before a
foreign court as well as before the courts of the other party's
country/place of business." 25 4 This potentially indicated that
asymmetrical arbitration clauses might also be validated by
Turkish courts in the future. 255
However, in 2017, the 15th Civil Law Division of the Court of
Cassation rendered a judgment which invalidated a bilateral
arbitration clause, merely because there was a (limited) option
between arbitration and litigation. 25 6 The case arose from a
construction agreement between a contractor and a subcontractor. 257 The sub-contractor, as plaintiff, started litigation
against the contractor, as defendant. 2 8 The defendant requested

251

Id.
252 Id.
258 See Court of Cassation, 11th Civil Law Division, Apr. 25, 2016, Decision no.

2016/4646.
264 See Petit et al., supra note 3, at 27.
265 Id. at 28.
256 See Court of Cassation, 15th Civil Law Division, Jan. 23, 2017, Decision no.
2017/259.
257 Abdilkadir Guzeloglu & Fatma Esra Guzeloglu, Use Extreme Caution: Recent
Judgment of the Turkish Court of Cassation Emphasizes the Importance of Clear
Wording of the Arbitration Clauses, GUZELOGLU (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.guzeloglu
.legal/en/news-insights/use-extreme-caution-recent-judgment-of-the-turkish-court-of-ca
ssation-emphasizes-the-importance-of-clear-wording-of-the-arbitration-clauses-200.htm
1 [https://perma.cc/3BNZ-GHUK.
258 Id.
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the dismissal of the case, relying on the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement. 259 The dispute resolution clause provided:

.

Any dispute between the company and the contractor that
may arise from the execution of this contract shall be settled
by arbitration. The arbitrators selected by the parties shall
appoint the 3rd arbitrator and the decision rendered by this
tribunal shall be valid. The arbitrators shall be a member of
. . and the arbitration costs shall be borne by the contractor.
Parties shall resort to Istanbul Courts and Execution Offices
for the matters that are not arbitrable and in cases stipulated
under the contract and its appendices. 26 0

The court of first instance dismissed the case. 26 1 The plaintiff
appealed. 26 2 The Court of Cassation overturned the decision of the
first court and declared that the (bilateral) arbitration clause was
invalid because it failed to reflect parties' clear and absolute
intention to arbitrate due to the last sentence of the clause, which
provided for the alternative jurisdiction of Istanbul courts. 26 3
"[T]he court held that an arbitration clause should clearly express
the absolute intention to arbitrate." 26 4 The dissenting opinion
stated that the arbitration clause was valid because it expressed
the parties' intention to submit all their disputes to arbitration,
provided that the dispute in question was arbitrable, and to
submit non-arbitrable disputes to Istanbul courts. 26 5 This decision
emphasizes that precision in drafting is essential with respect to
arbitration agreements in Turkey, in order to clearly and
unequivocally establish the parties' intention to arbitrate. 26 6
As such, for now, asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses
that provide for an option between arbitration and state courts
(bilateral or unilateral) are likely invalid under Turkish law. 26 7

Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
259

Id.
Id.
265 Id.
263
264

266 Id.
267

See Petit et al., supra note 3, at 28.
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V. JURISDICTIONS WHERE THE JURY IS STILL OUT

A. France
Our review has revealed only two cases where French courts
dealt with a unilateral option to choose between litigation and
arbitration.
First, the Sicaly v. Grasso case from 1974 involved a
commercial dispute between a French company (Sicaly) and a
Dutch company (Grasso). 268 The contract was governed by Dutch
law, and provided for a dispute resolution clause, which, in
essence, gave jurisdiction to either Dutch state courts or a Dutch
arbitral institution at the election of only one party. 26 9 The clause
was included in the General Conditions for Delivery and Payment
in the Metallic Industry, which were annexed to the contract
concluded by the parties. 270
Despite the dispute resolution clause, the French company
started litigation against the Dutch company before a French
court (the Saumur Commercial Court). 27 1 The French court of first
instance interpreted the dispute resolution clause (which was
deemed valid) in the sense that, by agreeing to the clause, Sicaly
had waived the benefit of Article 14 of the French Civil Code,
which grants jurisdiction to French courts on the sole ground that
the plaintiff is a French national.272 As such, French courts lacked
the exceptional jurisdiction that they would otherwise derive from
Article 14 of the French Civil Code. 273 The appellate court of
Angers similarly found that French courts lacked jurisdiction. 2 74
Sicaly appealed to the French Supreme Court. 275

268 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., May 15,
1974, 72-14706 (affirming Angers Court of Appeal, decision dated Sept. 25, 1972).
269

Id.

270 Id.
271 Id.

272 Angers Court of Appeal [appellate court], decision dated Sept. 25, 1972. See also
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on International
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55 TUL L.
REV. 1, 25, n.72 (1981).
273

Id.

274 Id.

276 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., May 15,
1974, 72-14706 (affirming Angers Court of Appeal, decision dated Sept. 25, 1972).
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In front of the French Supreme Court, Sicaly argued that, by
agreeing to the dispute resolution clause, Sicaly had not waived
its benefit under Article 14 of the French Civil Code, of being able
to start litigation against a foreign defendant before French
courts. 276 The French Supreme Court rejected this argument,
stating that the wording of the dispute resolution clause did imply
waiver of that benefit. 277 In reaching its decision, the French
Supreme Court presumably relied on the fact that the contract
was governed by Dutch law and that Sicaly had made an election
of domicile (for service of process purposes) at the address of the
Dutch companies, as reference to these particular facts was made
in the decision. 278
Sicaly also argued in front of the French Supreme Court,
under French and Dutch law, and under the 1961 European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (to which
France, but not the Netherlands, is a party), that the dispute
resolution clause was invalid, for several reasons, including: (1)
the dispute resolution clause only gave the option to choose
between courts and arbitration to one party, and, as such, did not
represent a valid agreement to arbitrate because it did not
absolutely eliminate the natural jurisdiction of courts; and (2) the
2 79
dispute resolution clause was contrary to French public policy.
In rejecting Sicaly's appeal and confirming the decisions of the
lower courts (that French courts did not have jurisdiction), the
280
Supreme Court did not specifically respond to these arguments.
However, by not responding, an inference may be drawn that
the French Supreme Court was not concerned with the validity of
the dispute resolution clause, from the perspective of the
unilateral option to choose between litigation and arbitration. As
such, indirectly, the decision validated unilateral option clauses. It
remains unclear if this case concerned a unilateral arbitration
clause (most likely) or a unilateral litigation clause, because the

276
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Id.
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280
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French Supreme Court did not cite the original wording of the
dispute resolution clause.281
Second, in Thermodyn v. M-Real Alizay, the French Supreme
Court invalidated a dispute resolution clause that contained a
(bilateral) option of either party to choose between arbitration and
litigation. The relevant clause provided:
each
If the dispute is not resolved within thirty (30) days ...
party has the option to have recourse to arbitration or to
litigation before the courts at the buyer's place of business.
The dispute will be submitted and finally decided by the
Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), which is integrated by reference in this
Article. 282
The French Supreme Court summarily held that, given each
party's right to opt between arbitration and litigation, the clause
did not make arbitration mandatory, but merely optional, such
that the claimant (the buyer, French) was entitled to commence
litigation in front of French courts. 283 This decision is hardly
surprising, given that arbitration requires a clear (bilateral)
manifestation of intent to arbitrate, which was not present given
the manner in which the clause was drafted. As such, this decision
is not useful to predict how French courts would interpret an
asymmetrical dispute resolution clause with a bilateral choice
supplemented by a unilateral option for either arbitration or
option. Importantly, however, the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement did not extend to the entire dispute resolution clause,
as it pertained to the chosen litigation forum.
The French Supreme Court also issued a number of
controversial decisions regarding unilateral forum selection
clauses: the Rothschild case, the Credit Suisse case, and the Apple
case. These decisions did not involve clauses having any
arbitration component, but nevertheless provide important
guidance regarding the French courts' comfort (or lack thereof)

281

Id.

282 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., June 12,
2013, 12-22656.
283

Id.
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with asymmetrical clauses pertaining to dispute resolution in
general.
The Rothschild case concerned a dispute between a French
national residing in Spain (Mrs. X) who opened an account at the
a
Paris
through
Bank
Rothschild
Luxembourg-based
intermediary. 284 The contractual arrangements between the
parties provided for "the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of
Luxembourg" but that the bank would have "the right to bring an
action before the Courts of the client's domicile or any other court
of competent jurisdiction."286 Despite the exclusive jurisdiction
clause agreed by the parties, Mrs. X later commenced proceedings
against the bank in France. The bank objected to the competence
of the French courts to hear the case, arguing that the (bilateral)
forum selection clause provided for the competence of Luxembourg
courts. 286
The French Supreme Court invalidated the forum selection
clause on the grounds that it contained a potestative condition, 287
namely, the bank's unilateral right to choose between
Luxembourg courts and any court of competent jurisdiction. The
court held that "[i]n accordance with the French and Luxembourg
law, obligations entered into under potestative condition are
invalid." 288 The court also noted that the potestative clause was
"contrary to the objectives and the finality of the prorogation of
jurisdiction" provided for in Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation
(before its recast). 289 In other words, the court "found that [the]

284 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Sept. 26,
2012, 11-26022.
256 Id.

286 Id.

287 Under Article 1170 of the French Civil Code, a clause is potestative if its
performance is subject to the occurrence of a condition precedent entirely within the
power of only one of the contracting parties to cause to occur or to prevent. See CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1170 (Fr.).
288 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Sept. 26,
2012, 11-26022.
289 Id. Art. 23 of the Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation) (now
Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast Regulation)) provides:
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a [EU] Member State,
have agreed that a court or the courts of a [EU] Member State are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts
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'one-sided' [forum selection] clause [did not represent] an
agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of the
Brussels I Regulation, but rather the imposition of terms by one
party on the other." 290 Consequently, the entire clause failed, not
just the option afforded to the bank to choose between
Luxembourg courts and any other competent court. Because there
was no valid forum selection clause, the French courts could hear
the case because there was a sufficient connection with France,
pursuant to French civil procedure provisions. 291
Similarly, the Credit Suisse case involved a unilateral forum
selection clause which provided that "the exclusive forum is Zurich
or the place of the bank subsidiary where the loan is entered into"
but that the bank would have "the right to bring an action against
the debtor before any other court of competent jurisdiction."292
Notwithstanding these terms, the debtor, Societ6 Civile ICH,
commenced litigation in France, before the Angers tribunal. 293 The
claim was brought against Credit Suisse as the lender, Soci6t6
Gen6rale as the guarantor, as well as against two other entities. 294
The Angers tribunal declined jurisdiction in favor of Swiss
courts. 295
The debtor appealed and, in 2013, the Angers Court of
Appeal confirmed the decision of the Angers tribunal, finding that
the forum selection clause was valid and that French courts
lacked jurisdiction.296 In so ruling, the Angers Court of Appeal
shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.
2001 O.J. (L 12) 8. In other words, parties to a legal relationship (contractual or noncontractual) can elect to refer any disputes between them (present or future) to the
state courts of an EU Member State of their choice and such agreement on jurisdiction
will grant to the chosen state courts exclusive jurisdiction (unless otherwise agreed by
the parties). It is unclear if the French Supreme Court considered or applied art. 15-17
of the Brussels I Regulation, which provide for specific arrangements for procedures
involving consumers.
290 See B6rard et al., supra note 6.
291 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Sept. 26,
2012, 11-26022.
292 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Mar. 25,
2015, 13-27264.
293

Id.

294
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295 Id.

296 Id.
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dismissed the arguments presented by the banks. 297 Credit Suisse
had argued that the forum selection clause was valid and that
Zurich courts had exclusive jurisdiction. 298 Soci6t6 G6n6rale had
argued that, with respect to the debtor's claim against Societ6
G6n6rale, Paris courts had jurisdiction, because Paris was the
domicile of Soci6t6 G6n6rale (defendant). 299 The court dismissed
Soci6t6 G6n6rale's argument, holding that the claims against the
two defendants were indivisible and that, as such, Zurich courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over the entire dispute.3 00
The debtor filed a second appeal, which was heard by the
French Supreme Court in 2015.301 The French Supreme Court
annulled the ruling of the Angers Court of Appeal for failure to
determine if the unbalanced character of the forum selection
clause, which reserved to the bank the right to pursue litigation
against the debtor before any competent court, "without
containing any indication of objective criteria to be used in
determining the competent court," was contrary to the "objective
of foreseeability and legal certainty" underlying Article 23 of the
Lugano Convention.3 0 2 The French Supreme Court referred the
case back to another French court of appeal (Rennes Court of
Appeal) to make that determination. 3 03
In 2016, the Rennes Court of Appeal determined that the
forum selection clause was invalid in its entirety due to the
unilateral choice of the bank in favor of "any other court of
competent jurisdiction" under Article 23 of 'the Lugano
Convention.3 0 4 The court reasoned that the unilateral choice was
invalid because it "did not reference any specific rule of national or
international law that could be used to establish that alternative
jurisdiction" and, as such, there was no agreement of the parties
on the competent courts to hear their dispute. 3 05 Like in the
Rothchild case, in the absence of any choice made by the parties,

297

298
299

Id.
Id.
Id.

300 Id.
301

Id.

302

Id.

303 Id.

304 See Rennes Court of Appeal [appellate court], 15/02999, Apr. 1, 2016.
205 Id.
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the court applied the relevant conflict of competence rules,
starting from the choice made by the plaintiff, who had
commenced litigation in France.3 0 6 The court held that the only
competent French court to hear the entire dispute (which was
indivisible) was the Paris court, as the place of domicile of one of
the two defendants (Soci6t6 Gen6rale). 307
As the last element of this saga, Cr6dit Suisse filed an appeal
with the French Supreme Court that was decided in 2018.308
Credit Suisse argued, once again, that the forum selection clause
was valid, in that the parties had designated the Swiss courts
(Zurich) as the competent courts, and the competence of any other
courts could be identified by applying the conflict of competence
rules that the Rennes Court of Appeal relied on, which would have
pointed, in practice, to one of three options: (1) the domicile of the
defendant; (2) the place of performance of the contract; and (3) the
place where the immovable property is located. 309 The French
Supreme Court summarily rejected these arguments and upheld
the decision of the Rennes Court of Appeal, holding that "the
validity of such a forum selection clause is conditioned by a
requirement of precision in order to satisfy the objective of
foreseeability and legal certainty underlying [Article 23 of the
Lugano Convention]" and that the clause, as drafted, "contained
no objective element permitting to identify other competent
courts, because the clause did not reference any specific rule of
national or international law that could be used to establish that
alternative jurisdiction."31 0 In other words, the French Supreme
Court validated its previous ruling from 2015, which, in turn, was
based on the ruling of the court in the Rothchild case.
Another case that dealt with a similar clause was the Apple
case.31 1 In this case, the French Supreme Court analyzed a
unilateral forum selection clause and concluded that it was valid
because it did not breach the foreseeability requirement (which
306 Id.
307 Id. See also 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3 (Article 6(1) of the Lugano Convention).
308 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Feb. 7,
2018, 16-24497.
309 Id.
310

Id.

311 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ., Oct. 7,

2015, 14-16898.
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the clauses in the Rothschild and the Credit Suisse cases were
held to breach). 3 12 The clause at issue provided that the holder of
the option could choose between the Irish courts, the courts of the
reseller's corporate seat (France), or "any jurisdiction where harm
to [the reseller] is occurring."3 13 As such, the clause provided less
options than in the previous cases analyzed. For this reason, the
French Supreme Court concluded that the requirement of
foreseeability was met, despite the unilateral character of the
clause, because it was possible to identify the jurisdiction
competent to hear a claim. 3 14
The Rothchild and the Crddit Suisse cases indicate a hostility
of French courts towards unilateral forum selection clauses. The
Apple case did not directly overturn the decisions in the Rothchild
and the Credit Suisse cases, especially if we take into
consideration that the last decision of the French Supreme Court
in the Cridit Suisse case was rendered after the decision in the
Apple case. However, the Apple case confirmed that if the choices
of the beneficiary of the option are determinable (even if not
absolutely determined) and relatively narrow, French courts will
uphold the agreement of the parties.
Moreover, these cases did not directly address the issue of
unilateral option clauses used in arbitration. In our view, the 1974
holding from Sicaly v. Gasso case still controls with respect to
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses mixing litigation and
arbitration, and we do not believe that French courts would strike
such clauses if the option is limited and allows to determine the
of
degree
a
reasonable
with
jurisdiction
competent
predictability. 315
First, the unilateral forum selection clauses that were
analyzed in the Rothchild and the Cridit Suisse cases are subject
to additional requirements in the European context (under the
Lugano Convention and/or the Brussels I Recast Regulation). In
particular, those clauses were held to be subject to the

312
313

314

Id.
Id. (author's translation) (emphasis added).
Id.

315 See Petit et al., supra note 3, at 26. But see Bdrard et al., supra note 6, at 4
(noting that France is on list of countries where unilateral option clauses are likely to
raise issues of effectiveness, together with Poland, Romania, and Turkey).
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requirements of foreseeability and legal certainty (predictability)
with respect to the competent courts. A clause where one of the
parties has the option to choose between litigation before the
courts of a particular country and arbitration in front of a
particular arbitral institution does not raise the issues of
predictability that were of concern in the Rothchild and the Crddit
Suisse cases ("any court of competent jurisdiction"), as illustrated
by the Apple case. That being said, asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses mixing litigation and arbitration can raise
(different) predictability issues, particularly where the restricted
party is the one to commence litigation, and the unrestricted
party, with the benefit of its unilateral option, could remove the
case from the forum where the restricted party brought the
dispute originally.
Second, the Rothchild and the Cridit Suisse decisions were
severely criticized and the French Supreme Court has in the past
changed its precedent in order to reflect changes in international
practice and evolving commercial needs. 3 16 The Apple case could
be viewed as a first step in that direction. Moreover, the Rothchild
and the Credit Suisse cases arose in the particular context of
lender agreements where the bargaining power of the two parties
is, by definition, unequal. Even if the courts did not apply the
specific national (and European) regulations regarding consumers,
the existence of an unequal bargaining power was necessarily a
factor that the courts considered in ultimately declaring the
clauses, which had been proposed by the banks, invalid. That
consideration would not be applicable with respect to an
asymmetrical dispute resolution clause concluded between two
commercial, equally sophisticated parties.

B. Germany
In a 1989 case, known as Injection Molded Parts, the German
Federal Supreme Court invalidated a severely unbalanced
unilateral arbitration clause. 317

316 See B6rard et al., supra note 6, at 7.
317 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 26, 1989, X ZR
23/87 (Ger.).
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In that case, the plaintiff was the bankruptcy trustee for the
assets of company H (former plaintiff in the matter).3 1 8 Company
H had manufactured and delivered injection molded parts as part
of a long business relationship with the defendant, company G.319
The subject of the dispute was the remuneration for not yet
amortized injection molds to be paid by company G to company
H.320 The contract between the parties stipulated that, at company
G's free choice and sole decision, instead of ordinary judicial
proceedings, an arbitration proceeding could also be carried out. 321
The arbitration mechanism contained several unusual features.
First, it provided that only one procedure (one arbitration) could
be conducted by the parties against each other at one time and
that the amount in dispute in each arbitration procedure was
limited to a maximum of DM 7,000 (German marks). Second,
company G was entitled to select a neutral person, specialized in
business or in law, as an arbitrator, who would definitively decide
the dispute. The decision would be immediately enforceable
without any objection. Third, the clause provided that the parties
would represent themselves and not have recourse to attorneys. 322
The lower courts ordered company G to pay DM 50,000 for
the injection molded parts.323 The defendant appealed, relying,
among other things, on the arbitration agreement. 324 The Court of
Appeal rejected company G's objection, noting that the arbitration
agreement in any event only covered proceedings up to DM
7,000.325 The court noted, however, that company G's complaints
against the arbitration agreement (as being invalid) were wellfounded. 326 However, those complaints did not lead to company G's
success in the appeal because the outcome of the legal dispute did
327
In
not depend on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.
other words, the arbitration agreement was invalid but it was not
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applicable to the dispute, which had been properly commenced
before state courts. The German Federal Supreme Court agreed
with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. 328 This decision
indicates that an utterly one-sided dispute resolution clause with
a unilateral option for arbitration may be invalidated as being in
violation of public policy. However, the particular unilateral
option in that case was truly exceptional, and the option's onesided character did not stem just from the fact that only one party
had the option to invoke it but from the other exceptional features
that it contained.
Similarly, in a 1991 case, the German Federal Supreme
Court invalidated a rather unique unilateral arbitration clause. 329
That case involved a dispute between a buyer and a seller, both
merchants (not consumers). The buyer owned a winery and
ordered wooden items from the seller.33 0 The quality was not what
was stated in the contract and the buyer refused to pay. 331 The
dispute resolution clause, which was included in General Terms
and Conditions attached to the contract, afforded the claimant the
option to bring disputes to arbitration, to the exclusion of the
ordinary legal alternative (court litigation). 332 The arbitration
clause provided that the parties agreed to avoid higher costs, if
possible, and to privilege the appointment of a solo arbitrator. 333 If
a solo arbitrator could not be appointed, each party had the right
to nominate its own arbitrator and, if one party failed to nominate
its arbitrator within a set period of time, the other party had the
right to request the Chamber of Commerce to appoint an
arbitrator for the party in default. 334 The clause further provided
for a mechanism in case of deadlock: If the arbitrators failed to
agree on the solution, they would appoint a chairman, who would
decide the issue. 335 Lastly, the arbitration clause provided that the

328

Id.

See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 10, 1991, X ZR
141/90 (Ger.).
330 Id.
329

331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.

334 Id.
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decision of the arbitrators was final and binding for both
parties. 336
The seller exercised the option, and commenced arbitration,
obtaining a favorable arbitral award. The seller then attempted to
enforce the arbitral award and requested a declaration of
enforceability from German courts. 337 The court of first instance
(LG Bremen) rejected the seller's request to declare the award
enforceable and revoked the award. 338 On appeal, the decision was
overturned and the award was declared enforceable. 339 The case
then went to the German Federal Supreme Court, who annulled
the appeal judgment. 340 The German Federal Supreme Court
refused to enforce the award and annulled it, holding that the
341
arbitral award was not based on a valid arbitration agreement.
In other words, the dispute resolution clause providing for a
unilateral option to choose arbitration was invalid.
The German Federal Supreme Court started its legal
analysis by noting that the mere inclusion of a (unilateral)
arbitration clause in the General Terms and Conditions of one
party does not invalidate it, because that fact alone "does not
disadvantage for the contractual
constitute unreasonable
partner." 342 It is worth noting that the dispute involved two
merchants but, on this point, the court would have likely reached
the same solution even if a consumer was involved.
The German Federal Supreme Court then noted that the
arbitration clause was not invalid merely because it was
unilateral, but noted that an "arbitration clause that only gives
one party the right to choose between arbitration and state courts
gives that party the possibility of influencing the content of the
desired decision by removing the legal control of the terms and
conditions of the contract from the state courts." 343 The issue,
apparently, was that the arbitral tribunal had not examined the
validity of the overall contract under mandatory German law,
336

Id.

337

Id.

Id.
339 Id.
340 Id.
338

341 Id.
342 Id.

343 Id.
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namely the General Terms and Conditions Act, an examination
which state courts would have undertaken. 344 In this sense, the
court observed that a unilateral arbitration clause will
unreasonably disadvantage one party where the specific process
for appointing arbitrators makes it unlikely that those arbitrators
will examine the terms of the contract against mandatory German
law. 345
As such, the German Federal Supreme Court held that
unilateral arbitration clauses are subject to "content control" by
the courts, even when they are concluded between merchants. 346
Such review includes the context of the entire contract and the
overall circumstances in which the arbitration clause was agreed
between the parties. 347 A particular feature of the contract
concluded between the parties was that if the buyer did not state a
complaint within the prescribed time (three days after receipt of
the goods), the buyer lost the right to rely on the non-conformity of
the goods and, even if such a complaint was made, the buyer still
had to pay the price, pending resolution of the complaint. 348 This
applied whether or not the deficiency complained about was
immediately recognizable or was hidden. 349 It was on this basis
(failure by the buyer to give notice of non-conformity within the
three-day period) that the arbitral tribunal had ruled in favor of
the seller.35 0
The court observed that this notice requirement, which was a
substantive provision in the contract, was closely related to the
dispute resolution mechanism, in the sense that, given the
shortness of the deadline (three days), it practically had the effect
of eliminating any claims of non-conformity of the buyer.35 1
Because both the notice requirement and the unilateral
arbitration clause were included in General Terms and
Conditions, their validity had to be assessed under the General
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Terms and Conditions Act. 3 5 2 The court found that the notice
requirement was invalid under the General Terms and Conditions
Act, as contrary to the requirements of good faith and fairness,
even when agreed between merchants.3 53 That was because a
clause which allowed complaints about open and hidden defects to
be made only within three days practically eliminated the legal
principle of the responsibility of the seller and the legal right of
retention of the buyer. 354 Because the dispute resolution clause
was intrinsically linked with the notice provision, the court
concluded that the dispute resolution clause was invalid. 355 The
court noted that a dispute resolution clause included in General
Terms and Conditions "must not open up the possibility of
deviating from the protective guarantees of the general terms and
conditions law".35 6
In a 1998 case, the German Federal Supreme Court added a
further layer of complexity to its case law on unilateral arbitration
clauses. 35 7 The dispute resolution clause at issue provided:
"Pursuant to our choice, the court in Gera or Munich or the
Hamburg arbitral court . . . in accordance with the Arbitration
Rules of the Commodities Association of the Hamburg Stock
Exchange ("Warenverein der Hamburger B6rse") shall be
competent to decide any dispute."3 5 8 The clause was, like in the
1991 case, included in the standard terms of one of the parties,
and, similarly, was assessed against the German General Terms
and Conditions Act.
Both the court of appeal and the German Federal Supreme
Court ruled that the clause was invalid insofar as the unilateral
option for arbitration was concerned.35 9 The court found that the
unilateral option placed the contractual partner at an
unreasonable disadvantage, because, in the courts' view, the
restricted party, when acting as claimant, does not know if the

352
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367 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 24, 1998, III ZR
133/97 (Ger.).
368 Id.
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unrestricted part will exercise its right to choose.36 0 In other
words, the party who is not the beneficiary of the unilateral
arbitration clause (the restricted party) runs the risk of incurring
unnecessary costs for bringing court proceedings only to then have
the beneficiary of the unilateral arbitration clause (the
unrestricted party) exercise its right to submit the dispute to
arbitration. The court held that such a risk is not reasonable for
the restricted party. 36 1 Interestingly, the court noted that the risk
could have been mitigated by additional contractual provisions
(for example, stating that the restricted party has the right, prior
to the commencement of litigation, to force the beneficiary of the
unilateral right to make a choice, and regulating the consequences
of a refusal to make a choice or of belated election). However, the
clause at issue did not include such mechanisms. 36 2
As such, the German Federal Supreme Court invalidated the
clause. The court was also careful to distinguish its decision from
that reached in the 1991 case, noting that the clause at issue in
the 1991 case involved a right to choose only as claimant/plaintiff
(not also as respondent/defendant). 36 3 In contrast, the 1998 case
involved a right to choose of a named party, whether acting as
A similar
claimant/plaintiff or as respondent/defendant.
distinction was made in recent caselaw in Russia (see Part IV.6
above).
In conclusion, although asymmetrical dispute resolution
clauses with a unilateral option to arbitrate are not invalid per se
in Germany,3 6 4 German law requires agreements to arbitrate not
to violate German public policy by being utterly one-sided, in light
of the overall features of the clause.3 65 In addition, with respect to
such clauses included in standard form contracts, German law
requires the agreement to arbitrate not to place the restricted
party at an unreasonable disadvantage, even when the clause is
applicable between commercial parties. Courts found such a
disadvantage to be contrary to the principles of good faith and
360 Id.
361
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362
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364 See Philip Clifford & Oliver Browne, FinanceAgreements: A practicalApproach
to Options to Arbitrate, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 39, 41.
365
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fairness and, therefore, "unreasonable," either due to specific
features related to procedural requirements or because the option
for arbitration is granted to a named party (without further
contractual language forcing an election to be timely made by the
beneficiary of the option), as opposed to it being granted to
whichever party will be the claimant.

C. United States of America
In the United States, it is the law of each individual state,
rather than federal law, that governs the issue of the
enforceability of any contract that touches arbitration. Section 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),366 now binding on the states,
provides that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 367 The United States Supreme
Court held that the "grounds" referred to in Section 2 of the FAA
are necessarily matters of state law.3 68 As such, "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements . . . ."369 "[S]ome of the most common arguments
against the enforceability of unilateral/discretionary arbitration
provisions are that they are adhesive, lack mutuality, and are
unconscionable."3 70
Asymmetrical clauses and consideration (mutuality of
obligation). Some state courts, based on, and taking to an
extreme, the "separability" of the arbitration agreement from the
366 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (noting that Section 2 of the FAA
"provides the touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of
federal common law envisioned by the passage of th[e] statute . . . [and] state law . .. is
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally").
367 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides, in relevant part:

A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. 2.
368 Nahmias, supra note 3, at 36.
369 Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
370 Nahmias, supra note 3, at 37.
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underlying contract, 37 1 held that an arbitration agreement must
independently, in and of itself, satisfy all the requirements of
contract formation, including consideration, and cannot borrow
"consideration" from the container contract3 72 Some federal courts
took the same view. 373 As noted by a legal scholar, this was
"separability with a vengeance[J" 37 4 requiring essentially
mutuality of obligation.
Such holdings are rare today. Notably, New York courts,
formerly at the forefront of requiring mutuality, 375 later rejected
371 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409 (1967). See
also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and UnconscionabilityAfter Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1010 (1996) ("In addition to the contract really
alleged to have been formed (the container contract), the separability doctrine pretends
that the party also alleges a fictional contract consisting of just the arbitration clause, but
no other terms.") (citations omitted).
372 See Stevens/Leinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Dev. & Mgmt. Inc., 795 P.2d 1308,
1313 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "Because under the separability doctrine the
arbitration provision is an independent and separate agreement, [it] cannot 'borrow'
consideration from the principal contract to support the arbitration provision" and
concluding that "the arbitration provision, which clearly lacks mutuality, is void for lack
of consideration"); Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 836
(N.D. Ala. 1999) ("Under this doctrine, an arbitration clause must fulfill all the
requirements of a contract including mutuality of assent and cannot rely on the container
contract for these elements."); The Money Place, LLC v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 714, 717, 719
(Ark. 2002) ("mutuality within the arbitration agreement itself is required"; "the
agreement to arbitrate is not supported by sufficient consideration, because [RP] is the
only party that has promised to forego her rights to seek redress in the court system" and
UP "has the option of pursuing arbitration or bringing suit in court") (citation omitted);
Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 664-65 (Md. 2003)
("[W]e have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in [Prima Paint] by considering an
arbitration clause of a larger contract to be severable therefrom . . . [in consequence]
"mutual promises to arbitrate [must be present to create] an independent enforceable
contract.") (citations omitted); Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 619,
630 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that exclusion of seller's claim against buyer from
arbitration clause invalidated any consideration for the buyer's promise to arbitrate, and
concluding that, because the arbitration agreement was separate and distinct from the
purchase contract entered into by the parties, it required its own consideration).
373 See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to
require arbitration where only one party to an employment contract (the employee)
was bound to arbitrate).
,74
Rau, supra note 3, at 24-25; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual
Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 542-47 (2002) (noting that "[p]rior to 1990, a
number of courts . . . refused to enforce nonmutual arbitration clauses, relying on the
doctrine of mutuality of obligation[,]" although "[t]oday, virtually all courts hold" that this
does not preclude enforcement of such clauses).
375 See, e.g., Cored Panels, Inc. v. Meinhard Comm. Corp., 420 N.Y.S.2d 731, 731 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979) ("void for lack of mutuality"); Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Silin, 399
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the doctrine's application to arbitration clauses. In Sablosky v.
Edward S. Gordon Co., the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York held:
Mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration contracts.
If there is consideration for the entire agreement that is
sufficient; the consideration supports the arbitration option,
as it does every other obligation in the agreement.
... Since . . . the validity of an arbitration agreement is to be
determined by the law applicable to contracts generally ...
there is no reason for a different mutuality rule in arbitration
cases. 376
The recent general trend of both state and federal American
courts is to uphold dispute resolution clauses which permit one
party (but not the other) to commence arbitration and to reject
both the separate consideration requirement, and the mutuality
doctrine. 377 As one court concluded, "[w]e see no reason why
justice should require perfect symmetry of remedy. . . ."378

N.Y.S.2d 738, 738-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause that
only one party could invoke); Kaye Knitting Mills v. Prime Yarn Co., 326 N.Y.S.2d 361,
363 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) ("It should be clearly manifest that the parties adopt
arbitration as their exclusive remedy .... "); Hull Dye & Print Works, Inc. v. Riegel
Textile Corp., 325 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
376 Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. 1989) (citations
omitted).
377 See, e.g., In re Am Express Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 142 (2d Cir.
2011) (enforcing non-mutual agreement to arbitrate under FINRA Code of Arbitration
Procedure for Customer Disputes); Forbes v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
552(TPG), 2009 WL 424146, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009); Price v. Taylor, 575 F.
Supp. 2d 845, 853 (N.D. Ohio 2008) ("[A] valid arbitration clause does not fail for lack
of mutuality, as long as consideration supports the contract."); Pridgen v. Green Tree
Fin. Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 655, 659 (S.D. Miss. 2000) ("[M]utuality of
obligation is not required for a contract to be enforceable."); Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc.,
154 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[M]utuality of obligation is not required for
arbitration clauses so long as the contract as a whole is supported by consideration.");
Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here the agreement
to arbitrate is integrated into a larger unitary contract, the consideration for the
contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause as well.") (citations omitted); Wilson
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989)
("Because the contract as a whole did not lack consideration, we see no grounds
justifying the district court's decision, which appears to be pervaded by 'the old judicial
hostility to arbitration . . . ."') (citations omitted); W.L. Jorden & Co. v. Blythe Indus.,
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 282, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker
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However, even in very recent years, there are still a number
of cases that require mutuality of obligation or consideration,
often citing Prima Paint.379 In our view, these holdings miss the
point on the function that the doctrine of separability is designed
to serve, which is to preserve the validity of the arbitration
agreement in case the container contract is invalid. As such, these
holdings misapplied Prima Paint, in the sense that the
separability doctrine and its underlying policies do not require
mutual promises to arbitrate nor prevent an arbitration clause
from "borrowing" the consideration of the container contract.
Moreover, under general American contract law, there is no
mirror image rule that would require that the obligations of one
party be exactly co-extensive with the obligations of the other. For
example, unilateral termination clauses have never been
problematic as to their validity. Consequently, "the doctrine of
mutuality . .. was not properly or sensibly applied to require that

Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 47 n.15 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding a unilateral
arbitration clause because "there is no such doctrine of complete mutuality as a matter
of federal law ... "); Verolme Botlek B.V. v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 1996 Y.B. CoMM. ARB.
824.
978 Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, 481 A.2d 553, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1984).
379 See, e.g., Raglani v. Ripken Prof'l Baseball, 939 F. Supp. 2d 517, 522-23 (D. Md.
2013) (stating that "courts are not permitted, when assessing the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement, 'to go beyond the confines of the arbitration agreement itself
and into an analysis of the validity of the larger contract"') (citations omitted); Noohi v.
Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2013) ("[A]n arbitration provision is
treated as a severable contract that must be supported by adequate consideration[;] ...
. [therefore,] the arbitration provision was unenforceable as a matter of law because it
was not supported by mutual consideration, notwithstanding the fact that the contract
as a whole was supported by adequate consideration.") (citation omitted); Caire v.
Conifer Value Based Care, LLC, 92 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (D. Md. 2013) (invalidating
agreement for lack of consideration and noting that "[t]he parties' obligations need not
be identical for an arbitration agreement to be valid, . . . but there must be some
mutual promise") (citations omitted); Independence Cty. v. City of Clarksville, 386
S.W.3d 395, 399 (Ark. 2012) ("[L]ack of mutuality to arbitrate in an arbitration clause
renders the clause invalid."); Gonzalez v. West Suburban Imps., 411 F. Supp. 2d 970,
973 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that lack of mutuality in separable arbitration agreement
rendered the agreement invalid); Richard Harp Homes, Inc. v. Van Wyck, 262 S.W.3d
189, 192-93 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) ("[A]n arbitration agreement lack[s] the necessary
mutuality of obligation where [one party was] limited to pursuing any grievance in an
arbitration forum while the [other party] retained the sole legal right to pursue legal or
equitable remedies."); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wisc.
2006); Tyson Foods, Inc. v; Archer, 147 S.W.3d 681 (Ark. 2004).
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the terms of contractual dispute resolution provisions grant
precisely identical rights and remedies to all parties." 380
Asymmetrical clauses and unconscionability. Despite
the rejection of the mutuality doctrine by most American courts,
some courts have relied on theories of unconscionability in holding
asymmetrical arbitration agreements invalid. For example,
Section § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination. 381

The cases invoking the doctrine of unconscionability typically
involve unilateral arbitration clauses with a twist, in the sense
that it is the weaker party that has a unilateral obligation (not a
unilateral right) to submit to arbitration while the more powerful
party (which is often the drafter) has a unilateral option to resort
to courts for the settlement of the dispute. Under this fact pattern,
courts sometimes found that the disparity was substantively
and/or procedurally unconscionable, and, consequently, declared
the arbitration clause void. The procedural element of the doctrine
of unconscionability focuses on two factors: "oppression" and
"surprise" due to unequal bargaining power. 382 The substantive
element focuses on "overly harsh" or "one-sided results." 383 "The
prevailing view is that these two elements must both be present in
order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a

380 BORN, supra note 22, at 85.
381 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW CoMM'N 1977).
382 See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Cal. Ct. App.

1982).
383

Id. at 487.
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contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability," but not
necessarily to the same degree." 384
Another frequent fact pattern involves unilateral litigation
clauses with carve-outs, where both parties agree to arbitrate any
disputes between them, but one party is expressly given the option
to initiate litigation as well, with respect to certain categories of
claims that are expressly carved-out from the overall arbitration
clause.
Most of the decisions that have applied the doctrine of
unconscionability to arbitration agreements come from state
courts, which often have histories of hostility to arbitration
agreements, and involve domestic (as opposed to international)
arbitration agreements. 385 In contrast, federal courts have
frequently refused to apply the doctrine of unconscionability in
similar scenarios. 386

384 See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 (1997).
385 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 691-94
(Cal. 2000); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999) (arbitration clause
in standard form contract of telephone company with consumer held "completely onesided" and unconscionable); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861
(W. Va. 1998) (in "contract between the rabbits and foxes," an asymmetrical arbitration
clause was "unreasonably favorable" to corporate lender against unsophisticated
consumer) (citation omitted); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 66970 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (arbitration agreement lacks mutuality because it required
employees to arbitrate all claims while employer had the right to court injunctive relief
for certain causes of action); Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1542; Showmethemoney Check
Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Ark. 2000) ("Given the lack of mutuality
to support the arbitration agreement, we hold the arbitration clause contained in the
'Check Cashing Agreement' does not constitute a valid enforceable agreement to
arbitrate .... "); Lopez v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., Nos. LA CV11-04611 JAK(JCx), LA
CV11-07116 JAK(JCx), 2012 WL 1655720, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) ("An
arbitration agreement that manifests a lack of mutuality-that requires only one party
to arbitrate-is substantively unconscionable."); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 341-42 (D.V.I. 2003) (the arbitration clause between employer and
employee unconscionable because it "unreasonably favors" the employer while the
employee "obtains absolutely no benefit from this provision").
as See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Saunders Concrete Co., 676 F.3d 1153, 1158 (8th
Cir. 2012). ("Courts have similarly rejected [the] argument that an arbitration
agreement is substantively unconscionable because it gives one party the sole
discretion to choose arbitration . . . ."); DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71,
81 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that, although "one-sided agreements to arbitrate are not
favored," there is no unconscionability where relevant category of disputes is subject to
reciprocal agreements to arbitrate).
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Empirical studies show that the number of unconscionability
challenges is on the rise. Where such "challenges once appeared in
less than 1% of all arbitration-related cases, more recently [as of
2008] they . . . appeared in 15-20% of all cases involving
arbitration." 387 Challenges on the ground of "unconscionability"
typically involve cases where the underlying contract is one of
"adhesion" and the weaker party is a consumer, employee or
franchisee 388 of the more powerful bargaining party, 389 contrary to
the "consideration and mutuality" cases discussed above, which
had broad application. Additionally, some state courts, most
notably, California courts, have taken the lead in requiring the
more powerful bargaining party to establish some "legitimate
commercial need" based on "business realities" for an
asymmetrical clause. 390 In Armendariz v. Foundation Health

.

381 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1440-41 (2008).
See also Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 622 (2009)
(acknowledging that the "total number of reported unconscionability decisions . .
increased nearly tenfold" between 1990 and 2008, and "those involving arbitration
clauses accounted for the lion's share of the overall increase").
388 On the availability of the "unconscionability" challenge to franchisees, see
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, 265 F.3d 931, 939-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (The majority found
that the franchise agreement "was a standardized, form agreement that [the
franchisee] was forced to accept or reject without negotiation," and, because of the "onesided" nature of the obligation to arbitrate, the arbitration provision was
"unenforceable as unconscionable under Montana law." Id. The dissent noted that this
was a "commercial contract between sophisticated business organizations," and that
the franchisee was an "experienced and sophisticated motel franchise operator." Id.
(Tashima, J., dissenting)). See also Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 907
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning contract between a "large wealthy international
franchiser" and franchisee with "limited financial means, owning small 'one-man
operated' Dry-Chem franchises").
389 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642-43 (1996);
Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 97-98 (2001). See also United States
v. Consigli Constr. Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 (D. Me. 2012) ("Most of the cases
invalidating unilateral arbitration clauses involve employee or consumer contracts,
where the doctrine of unconscionability has greater application than in the commercial
context, and many of these cases conclude that these clauses both lack mutuality and
are unconscionable.").
390 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691-94 (requiring a "legitimate commercial need" or a
"reasonable justification" for lack of mutuality). See also Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal.
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Psychcare Services, Inc., decided in 2000, the California Supreme
Court examined an agreement by an employee to arbitrate
wrongful termination or employment discrimination claims, which
the employer had imposed on a prospective or current employees
as a condition of employment. 39 1 The employee claimed that
were
agreement
arbitration
of the
provisions
several
unconscionable, including because the arbitration agreement was
not bilateral. 392 The court concluded that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionably unilateral 393 and that the
unconscionable provisions rendered the entire arbitration
agreement unenforceable. 394
The court first determined that the contract was one of
adhesion, defined as "a standardized contract, which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the
contract or reject it."395 The court noted that, pursuant to
generally accepted principles, an adhesion contract will not be
enforced against the weaker party even if consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties, if, considered in its context,
it is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. 39 6 The court found the
arbitration agreement to be unconscionable, holding:
Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs
arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employer
with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the

employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when
it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at
least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness
based on "business realities." . . . If the arbitration system
established by the employer is indeed fair, then the employer

Rptr. 2d 376, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). See generally Stephen A. Broome, An
Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California
Courts are Circumventing the Federal ArbitrationAct, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39 (2006)
(reviewing two decades of California appellate cases).
391 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 674.
392 Id. at 675-76.
393 Id. at 692-94.
394 Id. at 698-99.
39
Id. at 689 (citing Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1961)).
396 Id. at 692.
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as well as the employee should be willing to submit claims to
arbitration. Without reasonable justification for this lack of
mutuality, arbitration appears less as a forum for neutral
dispute resolution and more as a means of maximizing
employer advantage. Arbitration was not intended for this
purpose.

[A]n arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context
lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one
contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences. The arbitration agreement in this
case lacks mutuality in this sense because it requires the
arbitration of employee-but not employer-claims arising
out of a wrongful termination. 397
In our view, the court placed a particularly high burden of
proof on the party with superior bargaining power, which will
have to justify asymmetrical clauses by demonstrating the
existence of "business realities" supporting the imposition of an
asymmetrical obligation to arbitrate without a corresponding
benefit to the other. 398 Any particular contractual provision that
confers benefits (or imposes burdens) unequally is presumably
"paid for" by adjusting the terms of the overall deal. Consequently,
it must be possible for the parties to reflect in their agreement, on
a clause-by-clause basis, their respective bargaining power and
skills, as well as risk allocation, including by means of an
imbalanced dispute resolution clause. The purpose of the doctrine
of unconscionability is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise.
It is not to disturb the overall bargained for allocation of risks.
The realistic explanation for the holdings in these cases is
that asymmetrical arbitration clauses are found "unconscionable"
as putative measures of consumer protection. In other countries,
national laws render invalid (not just unenforceable as applied to
a particular dispute) arbitration agreements pertaining to
consumer, employment, or franchise disputes. An additional factor

397
398

Id. at 692-94.
See Rau, supra note 3, at 30.
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is an ongoing war between state courts (favoring litigation) and
federal policy (promoting arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution). As applied to the context of asymmetrical
arbitration clauses, the doctrine of unconscionability assumes the
inferiority of arbitration to litigation. 399 Things are still evolving
with respect to the acceptance of arbitration as an alternative
method of dispute resolution. Interestingly, in 2011, the United
States Supreme Court held that California courts could not hold
"unconscionable" the increasingly common provisions in adhesion
contracts barring class-wide proceedings and requiring arbitration
to proceed on a bilateral basis. 400 However, to date, the United
States Supreme Court has refused to declare that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts the requirements crafted by some state
courts for asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses to be upheld
and not ruled unconscionable. 4 01
In conclusion, the same evolution that took place in the
United Kingdom, from invalidity to validity (see Part 111.7 above),
can be observed in the United States but is still ongoing. Early
decisions relied on the "mutuality doctrine" and the requirement
of "consideration" to refuse to enforce asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses. In more recent years, most American courts
have generally upheld asymmetrical clauses, rejecting both the
mutuality doctrine and the separate consideration requirement,
but there are still traces left. Moreover, despite a general trend
some
toward enforcing asymmetrical arbitration clauses,
American courts have relied and continue to rely on theories of
399 See, e.g., THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (10th
Cir. 2014) (state courts had ruled that an agreement permitting a nursing home "to
litigate its most likely claims against the resident-guardianship, collection, and
eviction claims-while requiring arbitration of the resident's most likely claims against
the nursing home-personal-injury claims and the like"-was unconscionable; the
federal court held that state rule was preempted by the federal law of arbitration and
that "[a] court may not invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that
arbitration is an inferior means of dispute resolution"); Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard
S. Lease Constr. Co., 656 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Alaska 1983) ("Arbitration is not so clearly
more or less fair than litigation that it is unconscionable to give one party the right of
forum selection."); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001) ("If arbitration will afford [RP] essentially the same opportunity to present
[its claims] as would litigation, there is no reason to believe that the agreement
limiting [RP] to arbitration is unfair.").
40 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 332, 356 (2011).
40 See, e.g., Winston & Strawn LLP v. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 108 (2019) (cert. denied).
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unconscionability in holding such clauses invalid. Lastly, there is
no consensus yet among state and federal courts regarding this
issue.40 2
CONCLUSION
This article reviewed case law in both common law and civil
jurisdictions and focused particularly on a number of recent
decisions. We first summarized the various approaches taken by
these jurisdictions and the key considerations that informed the
decisions reviewed. We then focused on the potential outcomes in
jurisdictions likely to hold asymmetrical dispute resolution
clauses invalid and argue for partial invalidity and severance
instead of invalidity of the entire clause. Lastly, we review the
risks associated with asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses
against their theoretical benefits of flexibility and offer practical
advice for drafting such clauses in a manner that maximizes their
chances of validity and enforcement.

A. Approaches with Respect to Validity and Enforcement
Legal authors are split on the issue of validity and
enforceability of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses. For
example, Alan Scott Rau criticized the application of the doctrines
of mutuality, separability, and unconscionability to such
clauses. 403 Similarly, Gary Born firmly rejected the application of
the doctrine of mutuality and noted that "an asymmetrical
arbitration clause is ordinarily best considered an appropriate
exercise of the parties' autonomy with regard to the mode of
resolving their disputes, which is entitled to full effect, save where
unconscionable under applicable law." 40 4 He further observed:
In general, there will be little basis for concluding that
asymmetrical arbitration agreements are unconscionable. The
right of a party unilaterally to select either arbitration or a
domestic court is an important procedural benefit.
Nonetheless, where the party's choice is between two neutral
forums, it cannot be regarded as fundamentally unfair or so
402
403
404

See Nahmias, supra note 3, at 38.
See Rau, supra note 3, at 30-32.
BORN, supra note 22, at 85.
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one-sided as to create unconscionable disadvantages for the
counter-party. 4 05

In contrast, Professor Hans Smit concluded that "[a]n
optional unilateral arbitration clause is patently unfair" based on
his perceived superiority of arbitration over litigation and a quasipresumption that such a clause would only be agreed to by an
economically weaker party:
When viewed in the light of delays and extraordinary expense
experienced in ordinary litigation, the optional unilateral
arbitration clause gives its beneficiary the unreasonable
advantage of being able to choose arbitration or litigation
depending on what best suits its purposes. Furthermore, the
clause's discrimination is typically practiced upon the
economically weaker party. No person intent upon protecting

its interests will agree to a unilateral arbitration clause,
unless it is economically compelled to do so or is unaware of
the disadvantageous position in which the clause puts it. In
either case, the person discriminated against appears to
deserve

opponent.

society's

4 06

protection

against

an

overbearing

Our survey of 17 jurisdictions confirms these differing
approaches.
Some courts, such as those in Bulgaria, China, India, Poland,
Romania, Russia, and Turkey, are generally uncomfortable with
asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses, under some form of the
mutuality doctrine. In addition to the countries specifically
surveyed in this article, the following countries are likely to
invalidate asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses: Brazil, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia,
South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. 407

400 Id. at 258, n.1430. See also Nahmias, supra note 3, at 37 ("[A] majority of the
contracts for large construction projects effectively are offered on a 'take-it-or-leave-it'
basis, with little or no room for negotiation. While some courts may be willing to
invalidate or otherwise refuse to enforce unilateral/discretionary arbitration provisions,
others are just as likely to conclude that such provisions are not unconscionable and
are valid and enforceable, despite a lack of mutuality or consideration.").
406 Hans Smit, The UnilateralArbitration Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 391, 404 (2009).
407 See B6rard et al., supra note 6.
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Other courts, such as those in Australia, Hong Kong, Italy,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and the United Kingdom are
generally comfortable with some asymmetry between the rights,
pursuant to the principle of party autonomy and freedom of
contract. In addition to the countries specifically surveyed in this
article, the following countries are likely to uphold asymmetrical
dispute resolution clauses: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Dubai, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands,
Nigeria,
Pakistan,
South
Africa,
Sudan,
Switzerland, Thailand, and Tunisia. 40 8
France, Germany, and the United States have a liberal
approach towards asymmetrical arbitration clauses in general,
except where they involve adhesion contracts or contracts
reflecting a significant imbalance in bargaining power, in which
case concepts of predictability, consumer protection, public policy,
and unconscionability may be used to invalidate asymmetrical
dispute resolution clauses. A similar situation might exist in
Sweden and South Africa.
Interestingly, three countries (Bulgaria, Italy, and France),
members of the EU, have reached different conclusions based on
the courts' application of the potestative doctrine. Italy has
validated unilateral forum selection clauses while France
invalidated the same types of clauses under the doctrine of
potestativity. Bulgaria applied the same doctrine to invalidate an
asymmetrical dispute resolution clause that granted only one
party the right to choose between arbitration and litigation (such
a clause is neither a unilateral arbitration clause nor a unilateral
litigation clause, as defined in this article). India used a similar
doctrine (contingent contracts) to invalidate unilateral arbitration
clauses.
Lastly, there is a lack of legal authority on this issue in a
number of jurisdictions. In countries that place great emphasis on
the parties' intent to arbitrate and require such intent to be clear
and explicit, asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses with a
unilateral option to arbitrate will likely be invalid. In this sense,

408 Id.
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asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses with a unilateral option
to arbitrate would be considered "pathological." 4 09
Despite this diversity of approaches, some interesting
conclusions can be drawn from our survey. First, the approaches
taken by these various jurisdictions do not follow "party lines"
imposed by the -traditional distinction between legal families. In
other words, it cannot be said that one trend is observable in
common law countries while the opposite trend is observable in
civil law countries. However, what is observable is that citations
to cases from other jurisdictions do tend to follow the common law
versus civil law distinction, in the sense that common law
jurisdictions cite to a case from other common law jurisdictions
(including for the purposes of distinguishing them) while civil law
jurisdictions do not cite cases from any jurisdictions, and rely
instead on the relevant statutory provisions, which might explain
the above-referenced referenced contradiction between France and
Italy when applying the same (European) legal framework but
different national laws.
the debate regarding asymmetrical dispute
Second,
resolution clauses goes back many years in certain countries, such
as the United States, but is relatively recent in many other states,
including the European Union. That is why only a general trend
may be discerned at this time. That trend is in favor of the validity
of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses, and we predict that a
majority of jurisdictions will uphold such clauses in the following
years (with the exception of consumer disputes and, more broadly,
adhesion contracts). As of today, specific and/or confirmed case
law is still lacking in a number of jurisdictions, making it difficult
to indicate what is presently the majority approach.
Third, there seems to be a unifying link between the
countries that will likely invalidate asymmetrical dispute
resolution clauses and those which would uphold their validity. If
we look at the jurisdictions surveyed in this article, we found that
Bulgaria, China, India, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey
disfavor such clauses. These countries have historically been
409 Fred6ric Eisemann, La Clause D'Arbitrage Pathologique [The Pathological
Arbitration Clause], in ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL: ESsAIs IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO

MINOLI [COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI]
(1974).
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characterized, for different reasons, by restrictive foreign investor
control regulations and a tendency to protect domestic
manufacturers. In contrast, the jurisdictions surveyed in this
article that are likely to uphold asymmetrical dispute resolution
clauses, Australia, France, Germany Hong Kong, Italy, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
have had a liberal approach to foreign investments.
Fourth, our review of the case law shows that the key
considerations on which the courts focused in analyzing the
validity of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses were, on the
one hand, the principle of party equality, and, on the other hand,
the principle of party autonomy and the binding effect of contracts
(pacta sunt servanda). The existence of a consumer or adhesion
context, or some other form of unequal bargaining power, were
also given great weight by the courts (especially those who
invalidated such clauses). Lastly, the degree of precision in
drafting the asymmetrical dispute resolution clause, and
predictability concerns, were also frequently invoked.
In the particular context of the European Union, another
factor was sometimes discussed, namely the impact of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which embodies,
in its Article 6(1), the "equal access to justice" rule. 410 The
provisions of the ECHR are applicable to court proceedings that
are related to arbitration, including those concerning competence,
annulment or set side, as well as enforcement and recognition.
Consequently, a court from a member state of the ECHR faced
with such an action will have to investigate whether an
asymmetrical dispute resolution clause meets the criteria
established by the ECHR. The issue arises in particular regarding
unilateral arbitration clauses which may have the practical effect,
if the unilateral right to arbitration is exercised, of removing a
dispute started by the restricted party from court litigation.
Courts from member states to the ECHR will "have to assess
whether the waiver of the right of access to a court established by

410 EUROPEAN CT. H.R., EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at art. 6(1)
, everyone is
(2010), ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly .. ).
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law was in accordance with the case law of the ECHR."411 The
issue may also come up in set-aside proceedings or at the stage of
recognition and enforcement, given that violation of the public
policy of a particular country is a ground to set aside or refuse
recognition or enforcement. 4 12
Interestingly, in Russia, the Presidium of the VAS cited
several cases from the ECHR, as well as Article 6(1) ECHR, in
support of its finding in the Sony Ericsson case that a unilateral
litigation clause (bilateral arbitration agreement with a unilateral
option to litigate given to one of the parties) violated the principle
of equality.4 13 In the United Kingdom, to the contrary, the High
Court refused to invalidate an asymmetrical forum selection
clause, noting that Article 6(1) ECHR "is directed to access to
justice within the forum chosen by the parties, not to choice of
forum."414 Similarly, in our opinion, Article 18 of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which gives
effect to the principle of equality in arbitration, should be
interpreted to apply only to treatment and conduct during arbitral
proceedings, as indicated by the title of the chapter within which
it is placed: "Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings."
Other legal scholars share the same view, and have noted:
Nevertheless, a party may waive his or her rights of due
process in accordance with the ECHR. Although it is not
required under the ECHR's case law - as the case may be
under US State law - that a 'reasonable justification based on
business realities' for the UAC exists, a waiver of the right to
access to a state court, under the ECHR, must be
unequivocal. Furthermore, the case law of the ECHR requires
minimum guarantees commensurate to the importance of the
411 See van Zelst, supra note 7, at 85.
412 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958), N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, https://www.newyo
rkconvention.org/english [https://perma.cc/QEH3-3GJF] (last visited May 1, 2021), at
art. V 2(b) (1958).
413 See Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VAS RF ot 19 iyun' g. No. 1831/12 [Ruling of the
Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012,
No. 1831/12], VESTNIK VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ROSSUSKOI FEDERATSU
[VESTNIK VAS RF] [Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian
Federation] 2012, pg. 6.
414 Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hestia Holdings Ltd., [2013] EWHC 1328
[43] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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right that is waived. In other words, the more relevant the
procedural right that is waived, the more stringent the test
will be as to whether such a waiver is unequivocal, as is
required by the ECHR's jurisprudence.
It is submitted that a properly drafted UAC meets these
requirements. After all, a UAC-provided that it is freely
concluded-provides for an unequivocal renouncement of the right
to access a domestic court. There is nothing in the ECHR's case
law to suggest that this is different in the case of a UAC which
confers the choice for arbitration or litigation on the beneficiary of
the UAC. After all, under a UAC the parties agree to submit the
dispute to arbitration, albeit subject to the choice made by the
beneficiary of the UAC-on the basis of the right explicitly so
granted to it by the non-beneficiary-to opt for arbitration.4 1 5
Fifth, our review indicates that whether or not a particular
clause will be given effect depends on a variety of fact-specific
circumstances: what party (the restricted or the unrestricted
party) commenced the proceedings, whether the proceedings were
commenced by that party in the default (bilateral) forum selected
or pursuant to a unilateral option to choose, whether the
proceedings were commenced pursuant to the dispute resolution
clause or in violation of the agreed-upon terms and the stage of
the proceedings when the challenge is launched.

B. Approaches with Respect to Remedies in Case of Invalidity
With respect to remedies, there are three possible scenarios
in cases of invalidity of asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses
(either unilateral litigation clauses or unilateral arbitration
clauses).
First scenario. A first possibility is that an asymmetrical
arbitration clause will be considered ineffective only insofar as it
prohibits the restricted party from enjoying a similar range of
choices for taking the claim to litigation or arbitration as the

416 van Zelst, supra note 7, at 86. See also X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App.
No. 1197/61 (1962) 5 Y.B. 88. ("the inclusion of an arbitration clause in an agreement
between individuals amounts legally to partial renunciation of the exercise of those
rights defined by Article 6(I) whereas nothing in the text of that Article nor any other
article of the Convention explicitly prohibits such renunciation").
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unrestricted party. The options of the two parties are evened up
by interpreting the clause as granting bilateral rights to the
parties. This would mean that the clause is ultimately effective,
but no longer unilateral, and instead becomes bilateral. This
stance has been taken by many Russian courts, starting with the
Sony Ericsson case, 416 but also by courts from other
jurisdictions. 41 7 From a practical point of view, as discussed below,
this scenario only applies to unilateral litigation clauses.
As such, if the clause provides for a reciprocal right to have
recourse to arbitration coupled with a unilateral right of one party
to take the dispute to courts (unilateral litigation clause), like in
the Sony Ericsson case, interpreting the clause as bilateral means
that both parties have a right to start either litigation or
arbitration. Consequently, the restricted party can also start
litigation proceedings. In the Sony Ericsson case, the (Russian)
party that had only the right to use arbitration, started
nevertheless litigation, before Russian courts. The Supreme
Arbitrazh Court basically had to decide if the right to have access
to the system of national courts for resolution of disputes could be
suppressed. The ultimate practical effect of the holding meant
that the Russian party was given access to the Russian courts,
despite not having it under the contract.
If, instead, the clause is a unilateral arbitration clause
providing for a mutually-selected judicial forum and a unilateral
right of one party to submit the dispute to arbitration,
interpreting the clause as bilateral would mean that the restricted
party could also start arbitration. If the restricted party started
arbitration despite not expressly having such a right, we believe
that an arbitral tribunal would not interpret the unrestricted
416 Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VAS RF ot 19 iyun' g. No. 1831/12 [Ruling of the
Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of June 19, 2012,
No. 1831/12], VESTNIK VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [VESTNIK VAS RF] [Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the
Russian Federation] 2012, pg. 6 (unilateral litigation clause). See also Verkhovnogo
Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Determination of the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation of July 6, 2016], BIULLETEN' VERKHOVNOGO SUDA RF [BVS] [Bulletin
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation] 2016, No. 305-9C16-7033 (holding
that unilateral litigation clause where only one party has the choice between litigation
or arbitration and the other party may only arbitrate is void as such).
417 See Union of India v. Bharat Eng'g Corp., (1977) ILR 499 (India) (unilateral
arbitration clause).
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party's unilateral right to bring disputes to arbitration as a
bilateral right. That is because agreements to arbitrate represent
an exception from the natural jurisdiction of the courts and, as
such, must be interpreted narrowly. In this scenario, the
hypothetical situation is that the agreement to arbitrate refers
only to disputes started by the unrestricted party as the claimant.
The problems raised by unilateral arbitration clauses are rather
whether or not the unrestricted party has a right to block
litigation started by the restricted party as the claimant, by
exercising its option for arbitration. English courts have taken the
position that such a right exists, in the NB Three Shipping v.
Harebell Shipping case. 4 18
Second scenario. The court will simply strike down the
asymmetrical portion of the clause, such that the party that had
the unilateral right will be deprived of it, which would leave both
parties with just the bilateral default option (in favor of litigation
or arbitration). For example, if the parties had agreed to litigation,
with one party having a unilateral option for arbitration, the
dispute would be resolved in litigation. The legal basis for only
invalidating the unilateral portion of the clause is the principle of
severability, known to most contract laws. 4 19
Third scenario. The inclusion of a unilateral right leads to
the invalidity of the entire dispute resolution clause. The legal
basis for invalidating the entire dispute resolution clause could be
that, under many national and international contract laws, 420 if
one of the terms of an agreement is invalid, the entire agreement
becomes invalid if it is proven that without that term the parties
would not have concluded the agreement at all. The initial option
beneficiary would argue that, without the unilateral option, it
would not have agreed to the dispute resolution clause, and,
therefore, that the entire dispute resolution clause should be
deemed void. Courts have invalidated entire dispute resolution
418 NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2001 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
419 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR THE UNIF. OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 3.2.13 at 412 (2010)
("Where a ground of avoidance affects only individual terms of the contract, the effect
of avoidance is limited to those terms unless, having regard to the circumstances, it is
unreasonable to uphold the remaining contract.").
420 See, e.g., id. at art. 3.2.2 at 410-11.
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clauses based on the finding that certain elements of the clause
were unconscionable 421 or illegal.4 22 However, application of the
doctrine of separability of the arbitration agreement from the
container contract might provide an argument against the entire
dispute resolution clause being considered invalid, because the
primary function of the doctrine is to preserve the container
contract, meaning all provisions other than the arbitration
agreement.
Under this scenario, either party will be able to bring a
dispute before any competent courts, as there would be no dispute
resolution clause. This is not a good outcome, for several reasons.
First, it disregards the elements that the parties have agreed
upon and opens up a number of possibilities that neither party
contemplated. For example, most conflict of competence rules
applied to contract dispute would point at least to: (1) the place of
residence of the defendant(s); (2) the place of performance of the
contract; and (3) the place where the property is located. As such,
the application of these rules leads to unpredictability, which is
precisely what dispute resolution clauses are meant to eliminate.
Second, the determination of the competent jurisdiction can turn
out to be very difficult in an international context, where conflict
of competence and/or conflict of law rules must be applied.
In our view, if the national law or mandatory precedent
requires invalidation of an asymmetrical dispute resolution
clause, the second scenario should be privileged and only the
problematic portions of the dispute resolution clause should be
struck out while preserving, to the greatest possible extent, the
original agreement of the parties, even if reached from unequal
bargaining positions. There are no two exactly identical parties in
terms of economic power, such that a finding of unequal
bargaining power should only be reserved for situations of
manifest discrepancy, to be assessed in light of the overall
circumstances of each case.

421 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
422 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], civ.,
Sept. 26, 2012; Emerging Markets Structured Products B.V. v. Zhilindustriya LLC et
al., Appellate Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, case no. A40-125181/2013 (Mar. 14, 2016).
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C. PracticalAdvice for Limiting Risk
Given the risks of invalidity or unenforceability identified in
this article, it is essential that the parties and their legal advisors
draft asymmetrical dispute resolution clauses very carefully and
with very precise languages. Prior to any drafting, it is imperative
to consider the applicable law and caselaw in all potentially
relevant jurisdictions: (1) the law governing the arbitration
agreement; (2) the law of the seat of the arbitration; (3) the law of
all jurisdictions where the parties have assets; and (4) the laws of
any other jurisdictions where a party might seek to bring
proceedings in breach of the dispute resolution clause (e.g., the
parties' home countries). 42 3
Decisions from the jurisdictions surveyed in this article show
that they are heavily dependent on the exact language used when
drafting the clause, the bargaining power of the parties, and the
conditions under which the provision was sought to be enforced.
A properly drafted asymmetrical dispute clause provides
significant advantages in certain circumstances, but even such a
clause can also carry considerable risks. Consequently, parties
wishing to include asymmetrical dispute clause should carefully
balance the advantages (optionality and flexibility) and the
associated risks (invalidity and unenforceability). Such clauses
must be approached with caution, on a case-by-case basis, to
reduce their susceptibility to challenge and, in the context of an
EU member state, to satisfy the requirements of foreseeability and
legal certainty required by the Brussels I Recast Regulation. In
the United States, specific research should be performed
regarding the relevant state law potentially applicable, as well as
an assessment of disputes being heard in state or federal courts.
Moreover, unusual provisions should be avoided, particularly in
contracts that have triggered an enhanced review by the courts
(employment agreements, loan agreements, franchises, etc.). If it
is agreed that an asymmetrical dispute resolution clause should
be included, the clause should be drafted in a clear and precise
manner in other to ensure its effectiveness to the highest possible
degree.

423 Petit et al., supra note 3, at 28.

630

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 90:3

The unilateral option should set out how and when it can be
exercised. For example, the clause should clarify if (and when)
notice of the election made by the unrestricted party must be
given to the restricted party. Moreover, the clause should state if
the unilateral option is subject to any conditions. The unilateral
option can be limited in a number of ways: (1) by providing that an
election can only be made with respect to certain kinds of disputes
("carve-outs"); or (2) by providing that an election right exists only
upon the occurrence of certain stipulated events.
The partial or total invalidity of an asymmetrical dispute
resolution clause could be avoided altogether with careful
drafting. For example, courts have held that where the unilateral
option is granted to whichever party will be the "claimant" (as
opposed to one of the two parties nominally) such clauses will
likely be considered valid. That is because, although optically
drafted as unilateral, they are, in fact, bilateral. For example, the
clause could be drafted as follows: "Any dispute arising in
connection with this contract is to be finally resolved by [state
court] or by the arbitration administered by [arbitral institution],
depending on the choice of the claimant commencing legal
proceedings."
Moreover, particular attention should be paid to excluding
the possibility of parallel proceedings, and the clause should
include language regarding "how to deal with any proceedings
that have already been commenced before the option is exercised
(as well as the costs of those proceedings)." 424 For example, the
clause should clarify "by when must any unilateral option be
exercised": (1) if claimant in the proceedings (for example, "before
commencing any proceedings"); and (2) if respondent in the
proceedings (for example, "before taking [any] specified
(substantive) step in any proceedings").4 25
As a simple rule, "both the litigation and the arbitration
aspects of the [asymmetrical dispute resolution clause should be
drafted] as though they were individual clauses," and "[t]he party
with the benefit of the option should refrain from any substantive
steps in litigation or arbitration proceedings before exercising its

424
425

Clifford & Browne, supra note 364, at 41.
B6rard et al., supra note 6.
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416 Clifford & Browne, supra note 364, at 41.
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